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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TANGREN FAMILY TRUST 
SHARON FISCUS, Trustee, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
Appeals Case No. 20140938 
RODNEY TANGREN, 
D efendant/ A ppellant. 
JURISDICTION 
T his appeal is taken from the Order Denying i\1.otion to Set Aside Judgment, filed 
September 15, 2014, by the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson of the Seventh District Court, San 
Juan County, State of U tah, which denied the UTAH R. Crv. P. 60(6) post-judgment motion 
filed by Appellant Rodney Tangren (hereinafter "Tangren"). 
pursuant to UTAH CODE A ·N. § 78A-4-103(2)G). 
This Court has jurisdiction 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & ST AND ARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I: Did the trial cou1t have the sttiject matter jurisdiction ivhen the 5 late of Nevada 
had entered an orderpe11aining to similar issues as raised 1?)1 the Plaintiffs? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Whetber a trial court bas subject matter jurisdiction 
presents a question of law which we review under a correction of error standard, giving no 
particular deference to the trial court's determination." Relier v. Relier, 2012 UT App 323, ii 7, 
291 P .3d 813 citing Case v. Case, 2004 UT App 423, ,1s, 103 P .3d 171. 
PRESERVATION: This issue is not required to be preserved. "Challenges to 
subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal." 
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Sonntag v. !Pard, 2011 UT App. 122, i/2, 253 P.3d 1120 citing Bro1v11 v. Division ef Water Rights, 
2010 UT 14, il 13, 228 P.3d 747. 
ISSUE II: Did the trial cott1t abuse its discretion in de1?)ting Defendant's LV!.otion to Set Aside 
the Default Judgment and Writ ef Restitution pursuant to UTAH R CIV. P. 
60(b) i?J, determining a) the service ef the 10-dqy Summons 1vas not prf!Judicial to 
Tangren, b) default judgment 1vas proper/y obtained !:ry Plaintiff and proper/y 
entered !:ry the trial court, and,· c) the tempormy restraining order 1vas proper/y 
issued? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW (UT. R. APP. P. 9(c)(7)(B)): " [A] 
trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to set aside a default judgment." Arbogast 
Famify Trust ex reL Arbogast v. River Crossings, LLC, 2008 UT App 277, ii 7, 191 P.3d 39 citing 
Lund v. Bro1vn, 2000 UT 75, ii 9, 11 P.3d 277. However, "the court's discretion is not 
unlimited." Id. citt"r1g Lund (stating that district courts have broad discretion in ruling on 
motions for relief from judgment); see also State v. 736 N. Colo. St., 2004 UT App 232, ii 7, 95 
P.3d 1211 ("A denial of a motion to vacate a [default] judgment under rule 60(6) is ordinarily 
reversed only on abuse of discretion." (internal quotation marks omitted)), afj'd sub nom. State 
v. All Real Proper!} at 736 N. Colo. St., 2005 UT 90, 127 P.3d 693. " [T]he interpretation of a 
rule of procedure is a question of law that we review for correctness." Arbogast Fami/y Trust 
ex reL Arbogast v. River Crossings, LLC, 2008 UT App 277, ii 7, 191 P.3d 39 citing Bro1vn v. 
Glover, 2000 UT 89, i/ 15, 16 P.3d 540. 
PRESERVATION: This issue is not required to be preserved, as it turns on the 
trial court's conclusions of law. However, these issues were preserved in Tangren's Motion 
to Set Aside and at oral arguments in post-judgment proceedings. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
I. U.S. CONST. ART. IV § 1 
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• 
II . UTAH R. CIV. P. 4 
III. UTAH R. Crv. P. 5 
IV. UTAH R. Crv. P. 55 
V . UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(6) 
VI. U TAH R. Crv . P. 65A 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. On February 24, 1994, T angren entered into a 99 year lease with his father, 
Richard T angfen, the Trustee for the Tangren Family Trust (hereinafter, the "Trust") for 
the subject property at issue below (hereinafter, the "Lease"). The Lease is attached hereto 
as Addendum "A" and incorporated herein by this reference. 
2. The Lease requires Tangren to maintain insurance on the subject property but 
is silent with respect to any particulars regarding insurance, including any required amount or 
types o f policies. See) Addendum "A" at ~iJs, 7. Tangren agreed to be responsible for yearly 
estimated annual real property taxes and insurance costs, which were to be paid in twelve 
(12) monthly payments each year with the monthly rent. Id at ifs. The Trust agreed to pay 
the real property taxes and insurance from Tangren's monthly payment. Id. at iJ7. 
3. In 2002, Plaintiff initiated a judicial action against Tangren, which requested 
the forfeiture of the subject property in favor of Plaintiff and the same trial court herein 
determined the Lease was invalid; however, T angren ultimately appealed and prevailed in the 
Court of Appeals and in the Utah Supreme Court. See) Tangren Famib Trust ex re! Tangren v. 
Tangren, 2006 UT App. 515, 154 P.3d 180 qffirmed qy Tangren Fami!J Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 
20, 182 P.3d 326. That case concluded in 2008. 
4. Legal proceedings were also initiated involving these same parties in the State 
of Nevada regarding the Trust. On August 22, 2012, the Clark County District Court 
3 of 56 
ordered Tangren to secure a $1 million liability insurance policy upon the subject property, 
to provide Plaintiff with evidence of the same, and to bear all expenses associated with 
securing the policy. T his order is attached hereto as Addendum "B" and is more particularly 
defined as the "Nevada Order". 
5. On March 1, 2012, Plaintiff initiated an eviction action against Tangren in the 
Seventh District Court, San J uan County, Utah, in order to evict Tangren from the property 
herein; however, this action was dismissed pursuant to the parties' agreement to dismiss it as 
part of the Nevada case. The docket of this case, District Court Case No. 120700005, is 
attached hereto as Addendum "C" and is incorporated herein by this reference. See also, the 
Nevada Order, Addendum "B". 
6. This case was initiated on April 23, 2013, by Plaintiff filing the Complaint, 
which requested an injunction against Tangren and for an order of restitution based upon 
the Lease 1. R010. The Complaint is attached hereto as Addendum "D" and incorporated 
herein by this reference. Plaintiff averred the Lease required Tangren to pay insurance and 
alleged Tangren had failed to make other insurance and tax payments required by the Lease. 
R004-R010. Plaintiff specifically alleged Tangren was having a fly-in (which includes 
skydiving and airplane activity) that would put the property at risk for liability. Id. However, 
Plaintiff attached did not attach the Lease or other default notices to the Complaint and 
simply alleged the breach. See, id. 
1 This action was filed by Plaintiff as a contract case. H owever, Plaintiff alleged the breach of 
the Lease by Tangren. Plaintiff alleged Tangren had failed to obtain the correct amount of 
insurance required by the Lease protect Plaintiff, the property, and Tangren. See, Complaint 
at p. 2. 






7. On April 30, 2013, Tangren was served with a 10 Day Summons and 
Complaint. R014; R013. The 10-Day Summons is attached hereto as Addendum "E" and 
incorporated herein by this reference. The Summons instructed Tangren to file an Answer 
within 10 days of the service of the Summons upon him, that a copy of the Complaint was 
attached to the Summons, and that a copy of the Complaint was on file with the court. 
R013. This Return of Service2 states Tangren was served with the Summons and Complaint. 
R014. 
8. The Complaint and 10-Day Summons do not have case numbers and appear 
identical to the captions of the 2002 case and the 2012 case Plaintiff previously filed in 
Seventh District Court, San Juan County, State of Utah. Thus, the three (3) court cases 
Plaintiff has filed against Tangren in Seventh District, San Juan County, Utah, appear nearly 
indistinguishable in appearance because the same parties are involved, in the same court, and 
before the same judge. 
9. On May 6, 2013, the matter convened for hearing on Plaintiffs' request for 
temporary orders, wherein Tangren maintained he complied with the Nevada Order. R015. 
Counsel for Plaintiff also indicated to the trial court that the Nevada case was only to handle 
the Trust and there was no pending case in Nevada. Id. 
10. On May 7, 2013, Plaintiff filed the proposed order from the temporary orders 
hearing, which was signed by the trial court on May 8, 2013. R017. The proposed order does 
not contain a certificate of mailing and was not served upon Tangren in any fashion after the 
2 All of the Returns of Service in this case are attached hereto as Addendum "F" and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
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hearing - thereby meaning Tangren had no opportunity to object to the proposed language 
of the temporary order. Id. 
11. The Temporary Order indicates the trial court reviewed the Nevada Order 
and ordered T angren not to have the fly-in on the property until S2,000,000 in liability 
insurance was obtained. Id. There is no certificate of service contained in the Temporary 
Order. Id. There is an address line on the bottom of the last page that indicates the 
Temporary Order would be served upon Tangren; however, Review of each return of 
service in this case does not show that Tangren was ever served with the Temporary Order. 
Id; see, Addendum "F". The Temporary Order is attached hereto as Addendum "G" and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
12. In July of 2013, Plaintiffs began to pursue defauJt against Tangren. This is 
evidenced by the court docket in this matter, which is attached hereto as Addendum "I-I" 
and incorporated herein by this reference (the docket was also attached to the Motion to Set 
Aside, which was filed later in the case). 
13. On J uly 3, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a proposed3 order of judgment and writ of 
restitution, which do not contain certificates of mailing. See, Addendum "H" at p. 3. The 
clerk's note on J uly 3, 2013, states, "[n]o default certificate has been submitted or entered on 
this case. The summons was not filed with the return of service." Id. 
14. On July 10, 2013, Plaintiff filed another Return of Service, which again 
indicated the Summons and Complaint were served on Tangren. R018-R019. This Return 
3 The proposed orders filed by Plaintiffs on July 3, 10, and September 3, 2013, are attached 
hereto as Addendum "I" and incorporated herein by this reference. None of the proposed 
orders contain certificates of mailing. 
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indicated the same date of service of the Summons and Complaint as April 30. Id. Plaintiff 
re-filed the Return of Service and the Summons on Return with the notation of the deputy 
in the upper right hand of the document per the direction of the clerk of the court to obtain 
the Default Certificate. See, id. 
15. Also on July 10, 2013, Plaintiffs filed the proposed default certificate and writ 
of restitution. See, Addendum "H" at p. 3. On J uly 22, 2013, the docket indicates the clerk 
noted, " [t]he Writ of Restitution refers to a Judgment, but no judgment has been signed and 
no judgment has been submitted." Id. 
16. On September 3, 2013, the proposed judgment was filed by Plaintiffs. Id. 
17. On September 5, 2013, the Order ef Judgment (the "Default Judgment") and 
Writ ef Restitution "Writ of Restitution") were entered, R021 & R023, and the matter was set 
for hearing to determine damages. R024. 
18. On October 14, 2013, Plaintiff moved for an order to show cause against 
Tangren. R026-R029. The basis of the order to show cause was that Tangren had failed to 
provide Plaintiff with a copy of the insurance policy and had permitted skydiving on the 
property, which was not covered by the policy. See, id. 
19. On October 22, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Return of Service, which lists service of 
the following documents upon Tangren: "Order to Show Cause", "Notice of Hearing for to 
Determine Rent and Insurance" [sic], "Notice of Judgement" [sic], and "Affidavit of Craig 
Halls". R030. No Notice of J udgment was filed by Plaintiff in this matter. See, id. 
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20. On November 4, 2013, the matter convened for hearing, wherein Tangren 
was advised by the trial court that the Default Judgment had entered against him. R031. 
Tangren was also assessed for Plaintiffs attorney fees at this hearing. Id. 
21. Until November 27, 2013, Tangren acted pro se in this case. R001-035. Prior 
thereto, Tangren appeared at hearings held in this case, but was unaware of the entry of the 
Certificate of D efault, Order of Judgment, and \'(/rit of Restitution, all of which entered 
without notice to Tangren. See) id. 
22. Prior to Tangren obtaining counsel, none of the pleadings filed by Plaintiff 
included certificates of mailing, except for the Certificates of Service filed by Plaintiff on 
November 25, 2013. Id; R034. 
23. Accordingly, Tangren obtained counsel and filed lviotion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment and Wi·it of Restitution ("Motion to Set Aside"), which was based upon UTAH R. Civ. 
P. 60(6) and argued excusable neglect justified setting aside the default. R042. Tangren 
argued the 10-Day Summons was fatally defective, Plaintiff violated notice provisions of 
Rule 5 and in her obtaining default, and that default itself was improperly obtained pursuant 
to procedure. Id. Tangren also argued he had a meritorious defense to the Complaint since 
he had complied with the Nevada Order, that the interests of justice and fair play had been 
violated, the Complaint's allegations were legally insufficient because it was really seeking to 
enforce the Nevada Order, and the injunction was improperly obtained. Id. Thus, Tangren 
argued the cumulative effect of the proceedings prohibited him from realizing the exact 
nature of the proceedings against him and therefore prejudiced him. Id. 
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24. On December 20, 2013, Plaintiff filed Rep!J Response in Opposition to Motion to 
Set Aside Order if Judgment and U~rit if Restitution, which argued the 10-Day Summons was valid 
and that it was unnecessary to give notice to Tangren based on his failure to answer. R062. 
25. On January 24, 2014, Tangren replied to Plaintiffs response. R157. 
26. Oral argument was held on February 24, 2014 (R0161); however, the matter 
was continued for additional evidence on March 11, 2014. See, Transcript of March 11, 2014, 
hearing, post. 
27. After hearing, trial court ordered additional briefing on the limited issue of the 
10-Day Summons issued by Plaintiff in this matter. 
28. On April 29, 2014, Plaintiff filed its brief on this subject on April 28, 2014 
(R0193); however, Plaintiff had mailed the brief to Tangren's attorney well before filing it 
and Tangren's Response to Plaintiffs Brief was actually filed before Plaintiffs Brief on April 
28, 2014. R0182. 
29. On May 27, 2014, the matter was submitted for decision and the trial court 
entered its fulling on August 13, 2014, \vhich is attached hereto as Addendum "J" and 
incorporated herein by this reference. R207. 
30. The trial court determined it did not credit Tangren's testimony regarding 
service or that he was confused by the multiple proceedings. Id. The trial court determined 
Tangren was properly served with the summons and complaint and determined the only 
ground for setting aside default it considered seriously was the service of a 10-day Summons 
rather than a 20-day Summons. Id. The trial court determined that, while erroneous, the 10-
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day Summons did not prejudice or affect Tangren. Id. Thus, the Motion to Set Aside was 
denied and the Order was entered. Id. 
31. On September 15, 2014, the trial court entered its formal order, Order Detrying 
LWotion to Set Aside Judgment (hereinafter, the "Judgment"). R211 . The Judgment is attached 
hereto as Addendum "K". 
32. Tangren has timely appealed. R.241. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. May 6, 2013, Hearing. 
On May 6, 2013, this matter convened for hearing on Plaintiffs request for injunctive 
relief. 5/6/2013 Tr. at p. 3. Plaintiff proffered that the Lease in this case indices the Trustee 
determines the estimate of the taxes and insurance for each year and Tangren would make 
that part of his monthly payment on the property. Id. at pp. 4-5. Plaintiff argued Tangren 
was holding a fly-in on the subject property and, when Plaintiff obtained an insurance quote 
to cover the property for this activity, Tangren refused to pay it because the amount was 
"outrageous". Id. at p. 7. Plaintiff alleged Tangren had been making payments for the 
insurance on the lodge, which the Trust obtained and Tangren made part of his monthly 
payment. Id. at p. 8. However, historically, no liability insurance had been purchased by the 
Trust. Id. at p. 9. 
Tangren indicated to the trial court that he would be representing himself because the 
case was "pretty cut and dry" and "self evident". Id. at p. 10. Tangren argued that, in 2011, 
Plaintiff determined there needed to be a million dollar policy on the property and $250,000 
on the lodge, which Tangren agreed with. Id. at pp. 10-11. Tangren paid these insurance 
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amounts for a year and a half. Id. at p. 11. Then Plaintiff determined there needed to be 
more than these policy limits and indicated the policy needed to be for $2 million and then 
$3 million, which Tangren disagreed with. Id. 
Tangren indicated to the trial court, which was undisputed, that he filed a case in 
Nevada to challenge Sharon Fiscus as the Trustee due to the disagreement they were having 
regarding the insurance policies on the property. Id. Tangren represented that the fly-in, 
including the sky-diving and airplanes, \Vas discussed with the Nevada court, which ruled 
that a $1 million policy was sufficient. Id. Tangren stated this matter should be resolved in 
Nevada and submitted the evada Order to the trial court, which it reviewed. Id. at p. 12. 
Plaintiff argued the Nevada case had been concluded but did not resolve the issue. Id. 
However, Tangren indicated more things needed to be brought up with the Nevada court. 
Id. at p. 13. Plaintiff stated the Nevada Order allowed Tangren to purchase his own 
insurance for the lodge. Id. Tangren indicated the Nevada Order allowed him to combine his 
personal insurance with what was needed on the property and secured ~250,000 on the lodge 
and a million in liability for the property. Id. 
It was clarified that the case involving the Trust was filed in Nevada because it was 
created there by the parties' mother, who also died in Nevada. Id. at pp. 14-15. The Plaintiff 
stated it was not relying upon the Nevada Order to determine what insurance should be 
required on the property, as Plaintiff wanted the runway and specific activities covered on 
the property. Id. at p. 17. Plaintiff argued it did not dispute the Nevada Order, which 
Plaintiff represented only covered the lodge, and further stated, " [w]e don't think the 
Nevada court should exercise jurisdiction over what k..ind of insurance should be placed on 
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the airstrip." Id. at p. 18, In. 14-16. Plaintiff argued the amount ordered by the Nevada court 
did not include the fly-in or other activities occurring on the property. Id. at p. 19. 
The trial court stated, " [s]ee, I think the Nevada court has no business whatsoever 
dealing with the contract, the lease agreement between the Trust and Rodney Tangren." Id. 
at p. 20, In. 14-16. Tangren responded that, "[t]he reason they did that is because that is still 
in the Trust, that lease is, and that's why it is in Nevada. I also have the insurance." Id. at p. 
20, ln. 17-19. 
The trial court stated the Lease should be determined in Utah and that if Nevada 
wanted to tell the Trustee what to do or not do, the Nevada court would need to be trustee 
or remove Plaintiff was trustee. Id. at pp. 20-21. The trial court determined the Lease deals 
with a parcel of Utah property and the Nevada court had no business enforcing lease 
agreements dealing in Utah property. Id. at p . 21. Based on Tangren's representation that the 
property is worth $2 million, the trial court ordered that Tangren obtain this in coverage or 
Tangren could not have the fly-in. Id. at p . 29. Plaintiff was ordered to prepare the order. Id. 
B. N ovember 4, 2013, H earing. 
This matter was called for hearing to determine the issue o f damages and attorney 
fees as a result of the breach of the Lease. 11/4/2013 Tr. at p . 3. Testimony was taken and 
exhibits were received by the trial court. Ms. Fiscus testified regarding the issues she and 
Tangren had regarding the insurance and the policies on the property. Id. at pp. 5-8. She 
further testified regarding default notices pertaining to rent and the amounts Tangren owed 
under the Lease. Id. at p. 7. Ms. Fiscus summarily testified that T angren had failed to abide 
by the Temporary order and had not been able to determine the exact terms of the coverage 
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of the policy Tangren had obtained on the property. Id. at pp. 8-9. Ms. Fiscus also testified 
she had not received a copy of the policy pursuant to the Temporary Order. Id. at p. 10. 
Later in the hearing, Ms. Fiscus admitted she had received the copy of the 
~2,000,000.00 policy in the past week or week and a half. Id. at p. 40. Ms. Fiscus testified she 
had her attorney request the copy of the poJjcy from Tangren; however, Tangren was under 
the impression it was sent. Id. at p. 42. Ms. Fiscus wanted to receive a copy of the complete 
copy of the policy, which the trial court said she could have. Id. at p. 43. 
Tangren also testified at trus hearing. Tangren testified he had complied with 
everytrung he had been ordered to do. Id. at pp. 27-28. Tangren brought up problems with 
the ranch to Ms. Fiscus and her attorney was aware of them because he had written 
correspondence regariling it in the Nevada case. Id. at p. 28. 
Plaintiff requested that Tangren be found in contempt of the trial court's temporary 
order because Tangren had admitted he conducted activities on the property and put the 
ranch in jeopardy of liability without having the appropriate insurance. Id. at p . 44. Plaintiff 
also argued Tangren had not supplied a copy of the insurance policy, which was requested 
repeatedly by Plaintiff throughout the proceedings. Id. 
Tangren disagreed he was in contempt because he had had done everything that was 
required, which was to get insurance in the correct amount. Id. at p. 45. Tangren argued the 
skyiliving event was doubly covered by his insurance and by Sky Dive Moab. Id. Tangren 
argued he had the $2,000,000.00 policy since day one and there was no way he would 
jeopardize what he had over frivolous things. Id. Tangren had no objection to Ms. Fiscus 
having a foll copy of the policy and had informed his insurance company of this fact. Id. 
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The trial court determined Tangren had not paid the amounts as reguested by 
Plaintiffs in this matter and further assess T angren attorney fees. Id. at p. 46. After reviewing 
the Temporary Order, the trial court determined it clearly stated Tangren was not only to 
obtain the insurance but to provide copies of it to Plaintiff. Id. at pp. 47-48. T he trial court 
stated, "[i]t's not the responsibility of the trustee or her attorney to keep nagging him to get 
it; but his responsibility to get it to them, which he didn't do." Id. at p. 48, ln. 2-4. The trial 
court determined this was an intentional act by Tangren and found Tangren to be in 
contempt of court. Id. at pp. 48-49. The following exchange then took place: 
The Court: ... You do realize, Mr. Tangren, that I've already signed a default 
judgment with respect to possession of the land? 
Mr. Tangren: I didn't - this is the first I've heard about this, Your Honor. 
Mr. Halls: I've sent you about three copies in the -
Mr. Tangren: Where have you - I have not-
Mr. Halls: -- I've served you with it. 
Mr. Tangren: I have not got anything on my email. If you did, did you not 
serve them through the sheriff like you did everything else? 
Mr. Halls: Twice. 
Mr. Tangren: Well, where is it? 
The Court: All right, you can go. 
Id. at p. 49, ln. 3-16. Whereupon, the hearing was concluded. Id. at p . 49. 
C. February 24, 2014, Hearing. 
This hearing was held for oral arguments upon the Motion to Set J\side. 2/24/2014 
Tr. at p. 3. Counsel herein argued the Motion to Set Aside in its entirety. When the issue of 
the 10-day Summons was mentioned by counsel, the trial court stated, "[o]bviously this isn't 
the classic ten day summons that the debt collection companies use. This was a shortened 
period of time which is common in eviction cases." Id. at p. 6, ln. 7-1 0. Counsel noted the 
first return of service does not indicate Tangren was served with the Temporary Restraining 
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Order. Id. Counsel made the trial court aware of the prior litigation between the parties and 
that the Summons in this case did not contain a case number. Id. at p. 7. 
Counsel argued the reason Tangren did not file an answer after the May 6, 2013, 
hearing was because from Tangren's point of view, nothing had happened. Id. at pp. 7-8. 
Tangren was unaware from May 6, 2013, to October 16, 2013, during whjch time he 
received no further paperwork in the matter and he was worbng on compliance with the 
trial court's oral order from the May 6, 2013, hearing. Id. at pp. 7-8. Plaintiff filed a 
proposed order from the May 6 hearing but there was no certificate of mailing indicating it 
had been sent to Tangren, wruch prevented Tangren from objecting to the content of the 
order. Id. at p. 8. Additionally, the proposed order was filed on May 7 and signed by the trial 
court on May 8. Id. T hus, even if Plaintiff mailed the proposed order to Tangren, there was 
not enough time fo r Tangren to object before it was entered by the trial court. Id. 
Counsel argued there were no certificates of mailing in this case until October 16, 
2013. Id. at p. 9. When Plain tiff began to seek default judgment and no documents 
concerning trus was deLivered to Tangren. Id. at pp. 9-10. The clerk filed the Certificate of 
Default on July 10 but had initially refused to do so; however, Plaintiff remedied the clerk's 
concern in order for her to do so. Id. The trial court stated that there is really no requirement 
that a party be informed the opposing party is seeking default if the party has not filed an 
answer after being served with a summons and complaint. Id. at p. 11. 
Counsel argued that T angren djd appear and participate in the proceedings. Id. 
Counsel then explained to the trial court which documents should have been served/ mailed 
to Tangren as set forth by the Motion to Set Aside. Id. at pp. 12-14. Counsel argued it was 
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inconsistent for Tangren to ignore this case when he had faithfully prosecuted his interests 
earlier in the other li tigation cases involving the parties. Id. at p. 18. Tangren requested that, 
based upon fundamental fairness, the judgment should be set aside and the case heard on its 
merits. Id. at pp. 18-19. 
Based on the arguments of the parties, the trial court stated that its decision would 
turn on whether the Summons and Complaint were served on Tangren on April 30, 2013. Id. 
at p. 44. The trial court stated that, as far as it could tell, the rules did not require the filing of 
anything except the certificate of default. Id. 
The trial court indicated there were only two (2) grounds upon which it could set 
aside the judgment in this case, which were: 1) Tangren was never served with the complaint, 
or; 2) Tangren was served with the complaint but was excusably negligent. Id. The trial court 
stated it would be very difficult for it to determine excusable neglect if Tangren was served 
with the complaint because it was possible T angren was confused, acting as a pro se li tigant. 
Id. at pp. 45-46. However, the trial court stated that, parties who elect to forego hired 
counsel suffer the penalty of confusion that results from not understanding the pleadings 
and failing to seek legal advice. Id. at p. 46. T hus, the trial court believed its decision was 
going to turn on whether or not it believed T angren was served with the complaint on April 
30. Id. The trial court stated as follows: 
It's very likely if I determine that he was served with the complaint, that I will 
determine that his neglect is not excusable. And if I find that he was not 
served with the complaint, I will without difficulty at all set aside the 
judgment. So I think I need to make that factual determination before I 
proceed. 
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Id. at p. 46, ln. 19-24. Thus, the matter was set for hearing in order to take the testimony of 
witnesses. See, id. at pp. 47-49. 
D. March 11, 2014, Hearing. 
This matter convened for hearing on March 11, 2014, to take evidence regarding the 
legitimacy of the service upon Tangren on April 30, 2013. 3/11 /2014 Tr. at p. 4. Deputy 
Shawn Chapman testified he properly served Tangren with the Summons and Complaint, 
which the trial court placed credibility upon in its final determination. Id. at pp. 5-18. 
Tangren denied he had been served with the Complaint. Id. at pp. 40-44. However, 
the trial court ultimately determined in its written ruling that it did not find Tangren to be 
credible. This determination is not attacked herein. 
Counsel for Tangren argued in closing that the returns of service and certificates of 
mailing on the pleadings in this case were suspect because the returns fail to list all of the 
documents Deputy Chapman testified he served and the certificates are not included in the 
pleadings at all until October of 2013. Id. at pp. 56-57. During this argument, the trial court 
stated, "[i]f you're going to spend your time on this, you're wasting it." Id. at p. 57, ln. 15-16. 
Counsel argued that the fact Plaintiff was not following proper procedure explained a lot of 
the confusion in this case. Id. After further explaining Tangren's position on this issue, the 
trial court stated, "[r)ight. Times up. Most of your arguments, Ms. White, are red herrings." 
Id. at p. 58. The trial court stated it was fully convinced the summons and complaint were 
served upon Tangren; however, there was an issue its attention had been drawn to in the 
Motion to Set Aside, which was regarding the issuance of the 10-Day Summons. Id. at p. 59. 
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The trial court then asked Plaintiff's counsel why a 10-Day Summons was issued in 
this matter. Id. Plaintiffs counsel stated it had requested a shortened period of time for a 
hearing due to the fly-in on the ranch. Id. However, the trial court stated that, while it 
understood the need for an expedited hearing, it cud not explain the summons stating 
Tangren had 10 days to file an answer to the complaint. Id. The trial court further stated it 
had looked in its electronic file in vain for any indication to what lead to the issuance of the 
10-Day Summons. Id. at p. 60. Further discussion between Plaintiffs counsel and the trial 
court determined that the Summons cud not fulfill the requirements of an unlawful detainer. 
Id. at pp. 61-62. The trial court noted that, while Tangren raised the issue in the Motion to 
Set Aside, Plaintiff did not address this issue in its response. Id. at pp. 62-63. The trial court 
indicated there was a possibibt:y that grounds for a three (3) day summons were met in this 
case but instead a 10-day Summons was issued. Id. Further, there was a case from 1975 that 
the trial court was aware of that had determined the defectiveness of a 20 day Summons 
when a 30 day summons was required. Id. at p. 62. 
The parties agreed additional briefing on this issue would be warranted, although 
counsel for Tangren had attempted to argue it at the previous hearing but had been cut off 
by the trial court. Id. at pp. 64, 66. The trial court thereupon set a briefing schedule for this 
issue. Id. at p. 71. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
On May 6, 2013, the trial court was presented with the fact that litigation regarding 
the issue of insurance had been undertaken in Nevada. The trial court immediately cusagreed 
the Nevada court had any jurisdiction in this matter and rejected the Nevada Order as 
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having any authority. However, this impacted the trial court's jurisdiction over this matter 
and the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter in this case. 
Additionally, the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Motion to Set Aside, 
as the Motion to Set addressed several errors committed during the proceedings. However, 
the trial court overlooked issues with service of process, the mailing of standard pleadings to 
Tangren from the Plaintiff, the failure of Plaintiff to follow several rules of procedure, and 
whether a temporary restraining order and default judgment were correctly entered and 
pleaded for by Plaintiffs. Based upon the cumulative errors in this case, the denial of the 
Motion to Set Aside should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION PROPERLY LIES IN THE STATE 
OF NEV ADA IN THIS CASE. 
"Subject matter jurisdiction .. . is the authority of the court to decide the case." Johnson 
v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28, i\ 8, 234 P.3d 1100 citing Chen v. Ste1va11, 2004 UT 82, ii 38, 100 P.3d 
1177. "Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even for the first 
time on appeal." Sonntag v. Ward, 2011 UT App. 122, i12, 253 P.3d 1120 citing Bronm v. Division 
of Water Rights, 2010 UT 14, ii 13, 228 P.3d 747. 
It is fundamental that the courts of each state shall give full faith and credit to 
valid judgments rendered in a sister state. [U.S.CONST., ART. IV, sec. 1; Van 
Kleeck Creamery, Inc. v. Lf:1/estern Frozen Products Co., 24 Utah 2d 63, 465 P.2d 544 
(1970)] . However, this does not preclude the court of the forum state from 
examining into the question of jurisdiction of the foreign state when that 
question is properly raised. [Id.; Simms v. Hobbs, Ok.I., 411 P.2d 503 (1966); Dery 
v. Wis1vall, 11 Ariz.App. 306, 464 P.2d 626 (1970); Tucker v. Vista Financial 
Corp., Colo., 560 P.2d 453 (1977); National Equipment Renta~ Ltd. v. T cry/or, 225 
Kan. 58, 587 P.2d 870 (1978)]. This is so because due process of law requires 
the acquisition of jurisdiction as a prerequisite to the validity of any judgment. 
A further rule applicable to such matters is that if the same issue as to the 
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jurisdiction of the foreign court was raised and adjudicated therein, then the 
determination of that issue becomes res judicata, and is entitled to full faith 
and credit, the same as any other issue that has been so determined.[47 
Arn.Jur.2d, Judgments, sec. 1260.) 
Fuf/emvider Co. v. Patterson, 611 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1980). 
In this matter, the issue of jurisdiction was addressed on May 6, 2013, in the 
temporary orders hearing. See, 5/6/2013 Tr. Tangren represented the trial court that he had 
challenged Ms. Fiscus as Trustee of the Trust in Nevada due to their disagreement regarding 
the payment insurance policies on the property. Id. at p. 11. Tangren stated this matter 
should be resolved in Nevada and submitted there. Id. at p. 12. Contrarily, Plaintiff argued 
the Nevada case was concluded but it had not resolved the issue of insurance. Id. Plaintiff 
argued that the Nevada court should not have jurisdiction over the kind of insurance on the 
property and the trial court determined the Nevada court had no business to deal with the 
Lease between Tangren and the Trust. Id. at p. 20. Further, the trial court erroneously stated 
the Nevada court would have to remove Ms. Fiscus as Trustee if it wanted to tell the Trustee 
what to do or what not do. Id. at pp. 20-21 . Thus, the trial court reviewed the Nevada Order, 
concluded it had jurisdiction, and ordered Tangren to obtain $2 million in liability insurance 
on the property. Id. at p . 29. 
Tangren did not raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction below. However, this 
challenge is appropriately brought in this appeal because subject matter jurisdiction goes to 
the authority of a court to decide a case, Johnson at il 8, and may be raised at any time. Sonntag 
at ii 2. Thus, even on appeal, this challenge is appropriately made herein. 
The trial court determined the Nevada court had no jurisdiction to make orders 
regarding Utah property and the Lease; however, the Nevada court was well within its 
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jurisdiction to make orders regarding the Trust. See, Fu/lemvider at 389. It appears the trial 
court determined the Nevada court had no jurisdiction without properly determining the law 
on the issue. T angren pursued relief in Nevada due to his disagreement with the Trust and 
the insurance policies it was seeking to place and obtained an order giving the Trustee 
instructions, which is within the jurisdiction of the Nevada court in a probate matter. Thus, 
the issue of res judicata is necessarily raised as well as the trial court's refusal to acknowledge 
the full faith and credit of the Nevada Order. See, Fullemvider. 
Accordingly, Tangren challenges the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction in that 1) 
the Nevada Order was entitled to full faith and credit as a foreign order and 2) the issue of 
insurance was subject to issue preclusion. 
A. The Nevada Order Was Entitled to Full Faith And Credit. 
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and 
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe 
the Manner in which such Acts, Records and P roceedings shall be proved, and the Effect 
tl1ereof." U.S. CONST. ART. IV § 1. The Utah Supreme Court has held, " ... a foreign 
judgment that is both valid and final cannot be collaterally attacked even if grounded on 
errors of law or fact." LVlatter of Estate of Jones, 858 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah, 1993) citing Data 
Management Sys., Inc. v. EPD Co1p., 709 P .2d 377, 379 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) (additional 
citations omitted). 
"To be 'valid,' for purposes of full faith and credit, a judgment must have been 
rendered by a court with competent jurisdiction and in compliance with the constitutional 
requirements of due process." Jones at 985 citing Data Nlanagement, 709 P.2d at 379. 
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"The second requirement for full faith and credit is that the judgment be final 
according to the laws of the state of rendition." Jones at 986 citing People of State of N . Y. ex rel 
HalV(!)' v. I-Ialvry, 330 U.S. 610,614, 67 S.Ct. 903,906, 91 L.Ed. 1133 (1947); Thorlry v. Supnior 
Cottt1, 78 Cal.App.3d 900, 144 Cal.Rptr. 557,561 (1978) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflicts 
ofLa1vs, § 107 (1971)). 
In Nevada, there are several appealable orders that exist rn probate proceedings. 
" ... an appeal may be taken to the appellate court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to the 
rules fixed by the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 4 of Article 6 of the Nevada 
Constitution within 30 days after the notice of ent1y of an order. .. instructing or appointing a 
trustee." NRS 155.190. 
The trial court in this case determined at the out-set that it had jurisdiction over this 
matter because the subject property is located in Utah and the Nevada court had "no 
business" over the Lease between Tangren and the Trust. Thus, the question is whether the 
Nevada Order was entitled to full faitl1 and credit pursuant to U.S. CONST. ART. IV § 1. To 
appropriately determine its jurisdiction, the trial court was required to determine whether the 
Nevada Order was valid and final. Jones at 985. 
The Nevada Order was valid because it was rendered by a court with competent 
jurisdiction. Jones at 985. It was undisputed by the parties on May 6, 2013, that they had 
participated in the Nevada proceedings and it is assumed they did so willingly. See, id; 
5/6/2013 Tr. at p. 11. 
Further, it was represented by the Plaintiff that the Nevada case had concluded. 
5/6/2013 Tr. at p. 12. \X/hile it was disputed whether the Nevada court received evidence 
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regarding the fly-in and Plaintiff argued the issue of insurance was not resolved, the trial 
court did not pursue this point any further. See, id. Based on Plaintiffs own representation, 
the matter in Nevada had concluded. Additionally, pursuant to Nevada law, an order in a 
probate matter that instructs the Trustee is an appealable order. N RS 155.190. The trial court 
reviewed the Nevada Order on May 6, 2013, and the Trustee is instructed therein by the 
Nevada court. See, Addendum "B". Thus, the Nevada Order was presumably a final order 
at the time of the May 6, 2013, hearing. As such, the Nevada Order was entitled to full force 
and credit and the trial court herein had no jurisdiction to enter orders regarding tl1e 
insurance when the Nevada case had jurisdiction over this issue and had ruled upon it. 
B. Collateral Estoppel Prevents The Issue of Insurance To Be Relitigated In 
This Case After It Was Fully Litigated In Nevada. 
The doctrine of res judicata embraces two distinct branches: claim preclusion and 
issue preclusion. Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Nen;qys, Inc., 2000 UT 93, ii 19, 16 P.3d 1214 
(2000) citing Sn;ainston v. Intermountain H ealth Care, 766 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1988). Macris 
continued as follows: 
The basic difference between the two branches of res judicata is simply put: 
while "claim preclusion applies to whole claims, whether litigated or not," and 
prevents parties from relitigating the same claim in a second suit, 18 James 
Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice§ 131.13[1] (Matthew Bender, 3d ed.2000) 
(emphasis added), issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, arises from a 
different cause of action and prevents parties or their privies from relitigating 
"particular issues that have been contested and resolved." 
Id. at ~ 34. The following test is applied to determine whether tl1e doctrine of issue 
preclusion is applicable: 
First, the issue challenged must be identical in the previous action and in the 
case at hand. Second, the issue must have been decided in a final judgment on 
the merits in the previous action. Third, the issue must have been 
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competently, fully, and fairly litigated in the previous action. Fourth, the party 
against whom collateral estoppel is invoked in the current action must have 
been either a party or privy to a party in the previous action. 
Id. at ii 37 citing Jones, !Fa/do, Holbrook & McDonough v. Da1vson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Utah 
1996); see also S1vainston, 766 P.2d at 1061. Additionally, "[a]ll four elements must be present 
for issue preclusion to apply." Id. citing Jones, Lf:1/aldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 923 P.2d at 1370. 
"In order for res judicata to apply, both suits must involve the same parties or their 
privies and also the same cause of action; and this precludes the relitigation of all issues that 
could have been litigated as well as those that were in fact litigated in the prior action." Estate 
of Covington By and Through Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 677 (1994) citing Schaer v. State ex 
rel. UDOT, 657 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 1983) quoting Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 690 
(Utah 1978). Covington continued as follows: 
Id. 
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents the relitigation of issues that 
have once been litigated even though the claims for relief may be different. 
Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983). Thus, whereas 
res judicata prevents a relitigation of identical causes of action or demands, 
collateral estoppel disallows a relitigation of issues. Schaer, 657 P.2d at 1340. 
In the instant case, the trial court was well aware the Nevada court had entered an 
order regarding the payment of insurance on the subject property in this case. However, the 
trial court erred by proceeding in this case because Plaintiffs' claims were precluded by 
collateral estoppel. 
As noted supra, it would be res judicata for any issue that had been determined in 
another action in a sister state that was entitled to full faith and credit. See, Fullen1JJider at 389. 
The Nevada Order clearly determined the issue of insurance and gave other instructions to 
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the Trustee regarding the subject property. See, Addendum "B". The parties even agreed to 
dismiss an earlier Utah action filed by Plaintiff against Tangren in the Nevada Order, which 
clearly signifies their agreement to be bound by Nevada's jurisdiction over them to abide by 
its orders. 
After the conclusion of the Nevada case, as indicated by Plaintiff at hearing on May 
6, 2013, Plaintiff pursued the issue of insurance herein that had been already contested and 
resolved by the parties in the Nevada case. LV!.acris at ii 34. However, instead of pursuing the 
concerns of the Trust in the Nevada case, Plaintiff pursued a different cause of action 
(eviction and breach of contract) in Utah. Id. 
The issue of the obtaining and payment of insurance is identical to the Nevada case, 
which was pursued by Tangren to remove Ms. Fiscus as Trustee due to his disagreement 
with her regarding the insurance. Id. at ii 37. The Nevada Order resulted in orders for 
Tangren to obtain insurance on the subject property, which Plaintiff alleged in this case that 
Tangren did not have at all. Further, as argued supra, the issue was decided in a final order 
and a hearing was held thereon, as shown by the plain language of the Nevada Order. See, id. 
The Nevada Order was also the result of competent, full, and fair litigation and there is 
nothing in the record no show the contrary. Id. Lastly, both parties herein were parties to the 
Nevada case. Id. Accordingly, each prong of the issue preclusion test has been met and it 
therefore should have been applied herein. lei. 
Further, inasmuch as res judicata applies herein, Plaintiffs' claims herein properly 
belong in the Nevada case, as they could have been litigated therein. See, Covington at 677. 
Plaintiff should have been prevented from relief simply because she masked her claims as 
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issues to be relitigated in Utah. Id. Accordingly, the trial court erred by determining it had 
jurisdiction when the Nevada court had fully litigated the issues presented by Plaintiff. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE PURSUANT TO UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(6). 
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from the final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect. .. or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." UTAH 
R. CIV. P. 60(6). The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for the reason cited 
herein, not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken. Id. Additionally, the requesting party must show he has a meritorious defense. See, 
Black's Title, Inc. v. Utah State Ins. Dep't, 1999 UT App 330, il6, 991 P.2d 607. 
When presented with a Rule 60(6) motion on the basis of excusable neglect, a trial 
court has broad discretion in deciding whether to set aside a judgment: 
This discretion stems from the equitable nature of the excusable neglect 
determination itself. By their nature, equitable inquiries are designed to be 
flexible, taking into account all relevant factors in light of the particular 
circumstances . .. the question is always whether the particular relief sought is 
justified under principles of fundamental fairness in light of the particular 
facts . 
Jones v. La)'ton/Okland, 2009 UT 39, ,117, 214 P.3d 859 citing Reisbeck v. HCA Health Servs. ef 
Utah, Inc., 2000 UT 48, P 15, 2 P.3d 447. "Excusable neglect requires some evidence in order 
to justify relief." Id. at ii 20. Excusable neglect is defined as the exercise of due diligence by a 
reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances. IVhite Cap Constr. Suppfy, Inc. v. Star 
lvlt. Consh~, Inc., 2012 UT App 70, i1s, 277 P.3d 649 (additional citations omitted). 
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In this case, excusable neglect existed throughout the case and is therefore argued 
herein in the chronological order of events, for the Court's convenience. When viewed as 
one large whole, the cumulative excusable neglect and prejudice developed throughout the 
case. As such, these arguments are presented below. 
A. Tangren Was Prejudiced By The Service Of The 10-Day Summons, Which 
Was Compounded By Plaintiffs' Failures To Abide By The Rules of 
Procedure That Occurred Cumulatively Throughout This Case And 
Affected The Outcome. 
Rule 3(a) of the UTAH RULES OF PROCEDURE states in pertinent part, " [a] civil action 
1s commenced (1) by filing a complaint with the court, or (2) by service of a summons 
together with a copy of the complaint in accordance with Rule 4." Rule 12(a) requires a 20 
day summons to be served upon a civil defendant. In unlawful detainer cases, a court may 
issue a summons containing anywhere from 3-20 days to file an answer, depending upon the 
nature of the unlawful detainer. See, UTAH CODE AN. 1. §78B-6-801, et seq, setting forth the 
Forcible Entry and Detainer code. 
In the case of Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. Insure•Rite, Inc., the court held, "[t]he unlawful 
detainer statute is a summary proceeding and in derogation of the common law. It provides 
a severe remedy, and [the Utah Supreme Court) has previously held that it must be strictly 
complied with before the cause of action may be maintained." Ibid., 2001 UT App 347, ~18, 
37 P.3d 1202 citing Sovereen v. 1VI.eado1vs, 595 P.2d 852, 853-54 (Utah 1979) (holding that where 
notice "did not give lessee the alternative of paying the delinquent rent or surrendering the 
premises" the no tice was "insufficient ' to place [the lessee] in unlawful detainer'" (citation 
omitted)). 
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In the case of Nla11in v. Nelson, the defendant was served with process by a California 
peace o fficer who falsified the facts in the return o f service. Ibid., 533 P.2d 897 (Utah 1975)4. 
Additionally, the summons that was served upon the defendant required an answer in 20 
days instead o f 30 days for an out of state resident. Ir/. The Utah Supreme Court held, 
" [s]ervice of process here was defective, not only because of the false return but because it 
required answer in 20 days instead of 30 days. Such service is jurisdictional." Id. 
The failure of the Plaintiff to serve Tangren with the correct summons created an 
unclear proceeding in this matter. It was unclear to the trial court and never fully explained 
by the Plaintiff why Tangren was served with a 10 day summons. See, Addenda "E", "I". A 
shortened time in which to answer a complaint, likely due to the unlawful detainer claim in 
the Complaint herein, is a severe remedy and must be strictly complied with before the cause 
of action may be maintained. Parkside at ip 8. Accordingly, as determined by the trial court, 
Plaintiff was required to serve Tangren with a 20 day summons; however, strict compliance 
with issuing the correct summons based on the relevant caselaw of Parkside and NI.artin "\Vas 
required in this matter. 
NI.artin is similar to this case due to the cumulative circumstances of this case. The 
incorrect summons in this case failed to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction; however, 
inasmuch as the trial court deterrnined Tangren was not prejudiced by the incorrect 
summons, T angren argues herein he was in fact prejudiced due Plaintiffs' non-compliance 
with the R ULES OF PROCEDURE and was prejudiced as a result. Plaintiffs' non-compliance 
complicated the proceedings, robbed Tangren of notice, and muddied the waters in order 
4 Martin is attached hereto as Addendum "L" and incorporated herein by this reference for 
the Court's convenience. 
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for a pro se litigant to determine what exactly was happening. Accordingly, the prejudice 
prong of thjs argument is examined post. 
1.Plaintiff Failed To Comply With UTAH R. CIV. P. 5 And Did Not Serve 
Pleadings Upon Tangren Throughout The Case, Thus Robbing Him 
Of Notice Of The Proceedings. 
A party filing a pleadjng after service of the summons and complain t is required to 
serve upon the opposing party a copy of the pleadings filed with the court by electronic 
filing, mail, email, fax, etc. See, UT. R. Crv. P. 5. Further, " [e]very pleading, order or paper 
reqwred by this rule to be served shall include a signed certificate of service showing the 
name of the document served, the date and manner of service and on whom it was served." 
UT. R. Crv. P. 5 (f) . A party preparing an order of the court must " ... serve upon the other 
parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision." UT. R. Crv. P. 7(£)(2). 
In this case, the trial court djd not directly rule on this argument from the Motion to 
Set Aside. However, the trial court noted most of Tangren's arguments were "red herrings" 
and the trial court focused its attention on whether the Summons and Complaint were 
properly served. 3/11 /2014 Tr. at p . 58, 59. However, the fact that none of the pleadings for 
approximately the first five (5) months of this case contained certificates of mailing 
contributed to the confusion in this case. 
Tangren and the Plaintiff have been involved in other litigation in Utah and in 
Nevada. Litigation in Utah had resulted in appellate decisions, whjch were cited supra. 
Further, Plaintiff had pursued an eviction case against Tangren in 2012, which Plaintiff 
agreed to dismjss as part of the Nevada Order. See, Addenda "B" & "C". Accordingly, when 
Plaintiff was served with the incorrect summons and Complaint in April of 2013, which did 
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not contain case numbers, Tangren incorrectly believed this '\Vas a continuation of 
proceedings continued with the prior actions. See, Addenda "D" & "E". This is particularly 
true when it is considered that these three (3) actions involve the Plaintiff suing Tangren in 
the same county in Utah and before the same judge. Thus, the caption of all of the pleadings 
of these court cases are similar in appearance and contributed to T angren's belief Plaintiff 
was pursuing further proceedings in an earlier case. 
This incorrect belief was further supported when, after the temporary orders hearing 
on May 6, 2013, he did not receive the proposed temporary order filed by Plaintiff - which 
was prior to the time in which he had to answer the Complaint and which he was 
undoubtedly entitled to object to - or the signed Temporary Order. The Temporary Order 
indicates it would be served upon Tangren; however, a review of the returns of service and 
certificates of mailing herein do not show it was ever served on Tangren. See, Addendum 
"F". However, the Temporary Order was Plaintiffs' basis to pursue an order to show cause 
against Tangren after Plaintiff obtained default judgment against Tangren. 
Plaintiff did properly abided by Rule 5 in any pleadjng in this case before Tangren 
obtained counsel. The following documents should have been mailed to or served upon 
Defendant pursuant to Rules 4 and 5: 
• Affidavit filed on April 23, 2013; R003. 
• The proposed order resulting from the temporary orders hearing. Plaintiff filed 
tl1e proposed Temporary Orders on May 7, 2013; the trial entered the 
Temporary Orders on May 8, 2013. R017; see also, Addendum "H" at p . 3; 
Addendum "I". 
• Proposed Judgment filed July 3, 2013; Addendum " I-I" at p. 3; Addendum "I". 
• Proposed Writ of Restitution filed July 3, 2013; Addendum "H" at p. 3; 
Addendum " I". 
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• Proposed Certificate of Default filed July 10, 2013; Addendum "H" at p. 3; 
Addendum "I". 
• Proposed Writ of Restitution filed July 10, 2013; Addendum "H" at p. 3; 
Addendum "I". 
• Motion for Order to Show Cause; the Return of Service filed October 22 does 
not list this was served upon Tangren. R030; see also, Addendum "F". 
As a result, Tangren was deprived of the opportunity to respond or object to 
Plaintiff's pleadings. While it may be argued Tangren failed to answer and therefore was not 
entitled to service, which is addressed post, the failure to provide Tangren with the time to 
object to the proposed Temporary Order and the fact the signed Temporary Order was 
never served upon Tangren lead to a snowball effect that supported Tangren's belief that the 
hearing on May 6, 2013, had concluded the matter. 
While a pro se litigant is held to the same procedural rules and the law, a pro se 
defendant's "lack of technical knowledge of law and procedure ... should be accorded every 
consideration that may be reasonably be indulged." Orem City v. Bovo, 2003 UT App 286, if12, 
76 P.3d 1170 citing Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983) quoting Heathman v. 
Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 266, 372 P.2d 990, 991 (1996). Tangren's lack of technical knowledge and 
procedure was not accorded every consideration that may be reasonably indulged when the 
default judgment was entered, particularly when a full review of the Returns of Service and 
the pleadings would have indicated Tangren had received limited notice of the proceedings. 
Tangren has opposed Plaintiff in every proceeding in which they are parties and has 
prevailed on appeal against Plaintiff. Accordingly, Tangren was prejudiced throughout this 
case and it resulted in default being entered against him, which he was unaware of until the 
November 4, 2013, hearing. 
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B. Default Judgment Was Improperly Granted Against Tangren. 
"When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to 
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear the 
clerk shall enter the default of that party." UT. R. Crv. P. 55 (a). "Upon request of the 
plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the amount claimed and costs against the 
defendant if. .. the default of the defendant is for failure to appear[.]"UT. R. Crv. P. 55 (6)(1). 
In this case, default judgment was improperly granted against Tangren contrary to 
Rule 55. Tangren did not fail to "otherwise defend" or appear in this case. Accordingly, the 
clerk should not have entered the default certificate herein as argued further below. 
1. Tangren Otherwise Defended In This Case. 
"'[A]ll that must be shown for the entry of a default is that the defendant has failed 
to answer the complaint in a timely fashion."' Roth v. Joseph, 2010 UT App 332, ,Jl 5, 244 P.3d 
391 citing Skancl?J v. Ca!cados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1998). However, whether 
a party has "othe1wise defended" is a matter of first impression in Utah under the particular 
circumstances of this case. 
The Federal Rule is similar to the Utah Rule respecting default judgments, which 
states, "[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to 
plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must 
enter the party's default." FED. R. Crv. P. 55(a). In analyzing default under the Federal Rule, 
the First Circuit Court of Appeals held, [a]lthough appearance in an action typically involves 
some presentation or submission to the court- a feature missing here- we have held that a 
defaulting party 'has appeared' for Rule 55 purposes if it has 'indicated to the moving party a 
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clear purpose to defend the suit."' Kry Bank of Nlaine v. Tablecloth Textile Co. Corp., 74 F.3d 349, 
353 (1 st Cir. 1996) citing li!J.u,iiz v. Vidal, 739 F.2d 699, 700 (1st Cir.1984) quoting H.F. Livermore 
C01p. v. Aktiengese!!scheft Gebmder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689, 691 (D.C.Cir.1970). "But because 
judgments by default are disfavored, 'a court usually will try to find that there has been an 
appearance by defendant."' Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Ee/at Computerized Technologies, Inc., 840 
F.2d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 1988) citing 10 C. Wright, A. :Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice & 
Procedure§ 2683, at 433 (2d ed. 1983). 
In the matter of H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengese!!scheft Gebruder Loepfe, the court 
found there had been an appearance when the parties exchanged letters and had a series of 
meetings and neither party had any doubt the suit would be contested if they did not reach a 
settlement. Ibid., 432 F.2d 689 (D.C.Cir.1970). In the matter of U7i!son v. liif.oore & Assocs., Inc., 
it was determined an appearance had not been made because the letter that was exchanged 
was partially responsive to the complaint but there were no settlement negotiations. Ibid., 
564 F.2d 366 (9th Cir.1977). In Direct Mai!, cited supra, it was determined the defendant's 
actions did not demonstrate "a clear purpose to defend the suit" because the settlement 
negotiations were conducted prior to and on the day the summons was served. Ibid. at 689. 
Thereafter, there was no contact between the parties. Id. 
In this case, Plaintiff obtained default against Tangren on September 5, 2013. R021 & 
R023. Tangren argued in the Motion to Set Aside that default was improperly granted 
because he personally appeared in this case; however, the trial court did not fully address this 
issue in its denial of the Motion to Set Aside. 
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Plaintiff appeared and defended himself at hearing on May 6, 2013. R015. The 
transcript from this hearing shmvs Tangren intended to represent himself because the case 
was "pretty cut and dry" and "self evident". 5/6/2013 Tr. at p. 10. Tangren argued that, in 
2011, Plaintiff determined there needed to be a million dollar policy on the property and 
$250,000 on the lodge, which Tangren agreed with. Id. at pp. 10-11. Tangren paid these 
insurance amounts for a year and a half. Id. at p. 11. Then Plaintiff determined there needed 
to be more than these policy limits and indicated the policy needed to be for $2 million and 
then $3 million, which Tangren disagreed with. Id. Tangren indicated to the trial court, which 
was undisputed, that he filed a case in Nevada to challenge Sharon Fiscus as the Trustee due 
to the disagreement they were having regarding the insurance policies on the property. Id. 
Tangren represented to the trial court that the fly-in, including the sky-diving and 
airplanes, was discussed with the Nevada court, which ruled that $1 million policy was 
sufficient. Id. Tangren indicated more things needed to be brought up with the Nevada 
court. Id. at p. 13. Based on Tangren's representation that the property is worth $2 million, 
the trial court ordered that Tangren obtain this in coverage or T angren could not have the 
fly-in. Id. at p. 29. Further, as argued supra, the fact that Tangren was never served or had the 
opportunity to object to the Temporary Order robbed Tangren of the ability to object to the 
form and content of the Temporary Order, which was never served upon him, and then was 
used as the basis of an order to show cause against him. This is particularly true when it is 
considered that the content of the Temporary Order differs than the oral ruling of the trial 
court. 
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Generally, all that is needed for entry of a default is that a defendant has failed to 
answer the complaint in a timely fashion. Roth at i115. However, the question of whether 
Tangren "otherwise defended" in this case does not appear to have been addressed by an 
appellate court. Thus, T angren has presented federal authority on the subject for this Court's 
consideration. 
While an appearance typically involves some presentation or submission to the trial 
court, Tangren appeared in this case and indicated to both the trial court and Plaintiff a clear 
purpose to defend the suit. Kry Bank at 353. Further, since judgments by default are 
generally disfavored, courts generally will attempt to determine whether there has been an 
appearance by the defendant. Direct Niai! at 689. 
In this case, Tangren did not fi le an answer prior to the entry of default. However, 
Tangren did otherwise appear and defended himself against Plaintiffs' claims in the 
temporary orders hearing, which was prior to the expiration of time in which to answer the 
Complaint. Tangren's position at the temporary orders hearing evidenced his intent to the 
trial court and to the Plaintiff that he had a clear purpose to defend himself, particularly 
since Tangren indicated other things regarding Ms. Fiscus as Trustee needed to be addressed 
in the Nevada court. Accordingly, Tangren otherwise defended himself in this case and 
default judgment was improperly granted against him. 
2. The Trial Court Erred By Entering Default Against Tangren 
Because Plaintiffs' Well-Pled Facts Did Not Show Plaintiffs Were 
Entitled To Judgment As A Matter Of Law. 
"Although 'a defendant's failure to appear warrants an entry of default,' it 'does not 
automatically entitle a plaintiff to a default judgment."' U?'isan v. Ciry of Hildale, 2014 UT 20, 
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ill 7, 330 P.3d 76 citing Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1998). "A trial 
court asked to render a judgment by default must first conclude that the uncontroverted 
allegations of an app]jcant's petition are, on their face, legally sufficient to establish a valid 
claim against the defaulting party." Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593, 595 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
citing Rajneesh Found. Int'l v. McGreer, 303 Or. 139, 142, 734 P.2d 871, 873 (1987) (according to 
great weight of authority, default itself constitutes only admission that allegations are 
factually true, not that they are legally sufficient to state a claim for reEef), rev'd on other 
grounds, 303 Or. 371, 737 P.2d 593 (1987). In other words, "[e]ven though a defendant fails 
to appear, a plaintiff is entitled to default judgment 'only if the well-pled facts show tl1at the 
plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Pennington v. Allrtate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 
932, 940 (Utah 1998) citing Skancl:y v. Calcados Ortope, 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1998). 
"An original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim shall contain a 
short and plain: (1) statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to reEef; and (2) 
demand for judgment for specified relief." UT. R. CIV. P. 8(a). "A court may enter judgment 
on the pleadings when the moving party is entitled to judgment on the face of the pleadings 
themselves." Mountain America Credit Union v. l\/IcClellan, 854 P.2d 590, 591 (Utah App., 1993) 
citing UTAH R.Clv.P. 12(c) . "It must appear to a certainty that the [non-moving party] would 
not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of its 
claim before a judgment on the pleading may be granted." Securities Credit Corp. v. Willry, 265 
P.2d 422, 424 (Utah, 1953) citing Michel v. iVIeier, D.C., 8 F.R.D. 464. 
In this case, Tangren failed to file an answer to the Complaint. However, this does 
not automatically entitle Plaintiffs to the Default Judgment. Wisan at i117. The trial court, was 
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required to first conclude the uncontroverted allegations of the Plaintiffs' Complaint were, 
on their face, legally sufficient to establish a valid claim against Tangren. Stevens at 595. 
Plaintiff was only entitled to the D efault Judgment herein only if Plaintiffs' well-pled 
facts showed it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pennington at 940. Accordingly, 
Plaintiffs' claims were required to contain statements showing Plaintiffs were entitled to 
relief and the appropriate demands for judgment for the specified relief. UT. R. Crv. P. 8(a). 
The Complaint in this matter requested injunctive relief on the basis of the lack of insurance 
on the property and Tangren bad refused to pay the insurance as required by the Lease. 
R010. The Complaint alleges the Lease is attached to the Complaint; however, the Lease is 
not attached to the Complaint, as evidenced by the record, nor was it filed separately. See, id. 
The Complaint also alleges the breach of the Lease by Tangren for failure to pay the 
insurance as required by the Lease and that Tangren bad failed to cure prior notices of 
breach of the Lease. Id. The Complaint again alleges these notices and letters are attached to 
the Complaint; however, these exhibits were not attached to the Complaint, as evidenced by 
the record, nor were they filed as separate documents. See, id. 
Plaintiffs were not entitled to judgment on the face of the Complaint itself. Niountain 
America at 591. T angren appeared on May 6, 2013, argued against Plaintiffs' claims and even 
argued that th.is case should be heard in Nevada, which presents a valid defense to Plaintiffs' 
claims. Accordingly, it was not certain that Tangren would not be entitled to relief under any 
state of facts that could be proved in support of his claim before a judgment on the 
pleadings may be granted. Securities Credit at 424. Hence, the trial court erred by entering 
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default against Tangren because Plaintiffs' facts did not show Plaintiffs were entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
3. Tangren Has A Meritorious Defense To Plaintiffs' Claims. 
'Judgments by default are not favored by the courts nor are they in the interest of 
justice and fajr play." Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189, 190 (Utah, 1962) citing 
Locke v. Peterson, 285 P.2d 1111 (Utah, 1995); Nry v. Han·ison, 299 P.2d 11 14 (Utah, 1956). 
"The courts, in the interest of justice and fair play, favor, where possible, a full and complete 
opportuni ty for a hearing on the meri ts of every case." Id "In the absence of prejudice, it is 
appropriate to pursue that policy which favors resolution of disputes on the merits rather 
than technicalities." Mryers v. Intenvest Corp., 632 P.2d 879, 882 (Utah, 1981). "A defense is 
sufficiently meritorious to have a default judgment set aside if it is entitled to be tried." 
Erickson v. Schenkers Int'/ Fonvarders) Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994). 
While this argument was denied by the trial court in its denial of the Motion to Set 
Aside, when viewed as one large whole herein, the default judgment should have been set 
aside because it was not in the interest of justice or fair play. Heathman at 190. The D efault 
Judgment in this case denied Tangren a complete opportunity for a hearing on the meri ts in 
this case. Id. Plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment in its favor simply because of a 
technicality. M01ers at 882. Further, Tangren's defense is that the trial court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction, Plaintiffs' claims regarding the insurance and rent were precluded by 
collateral estoppel, and he had in fact complied with the Nevada Order to obtain insurance 
on the property or that he did obtain the appropriate insurance during the pendency of the 
case. These defenses are sufficiently meritorious and are entitled to be tried. Erickson at 1149. 
38 of 56 
• 
These defenses were presented to the trial court on May 6, 2013. Thus, default judgment was 
improperly granted herein. 
C. The Preliminary Injunction Did Not Comply With Rule 65(A) And Was 
Wrongfully Issued. 
"Every temporary restraining order . .. shall define the injury and state why it is 
irreparable." UT. R. Clv. P. 65A(b)(2). "Every restraining order and order granting an 
injunction shall set forth the reasons for its issuance. It shall be specific in terms and shall 
describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the 
act or acts sought to be restrained." UT. R. Crv. P. 65A(d). 
Rule 65(A)(e) states as follows: 
A restraining order or preliminary injunction may issue only upon a showing 
by the applicant that: 
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or injunction 
issues; 
(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage the 
proposed order or injunction may cause the party restrained or enjoined; 
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public 
interest; and 
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will p revail on the 
merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on the 
merits which should be the subject of further litigation. 
"To prevail on a motion for p reliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish both its 
standing and the requirements of the preliminary injunction." Southern Utah LVilderness Alliance 
v. Thompson, 811 F.Supp 635, 640 (D. Utah, 1993). 
A temporary restraining order that failed to define the injury and state why it was 
irreparable, containing instead mere conclusory statements, and that failed to list the reasons 
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for extending the order, was improperly granted. Birch Creek Irrigation v. Prothero, 858 P.2d 
990, 994-995 (Utah, 1993). In the case of System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, the Utah Supreme 
Court determined that a trial court had not addressed the standards of Rule 65A in its 
findings and therefore erred as a matter of law. Ibid., 669 P.2d 421, 429 (Utah, 1983). 
In this case, Plaintiffs did not file an actual motion for injunctive relief but instead 
includes this request in the Complaint. R010. The Complaint alleges Plaintiffs had no other 
adequate remedy at law or otherwise due to the threatened harm of the fly-in and alleges 
irreparable harm. See, Complaint at p. 4, il~16-17. The Plaintiffs also filed an Affidavit from 
Ms. Fiscus to support the request. R003. The trial court issued an order on the same date as 
the filing of the Complaint, which ordered T angren to appear for hearing for temporary 
orders to determine whether Tangren should be enjoined from allowing the fly-in, whether 
Tangren should be ordered to obtain liability insurance for the property, and setting a date 
for hearing to consider an order of restitution. R012. 
After hearing on May 6, 2013, Plaintiffs prepared a proposed temporary order, which 
was filed with the trial court on May 7, 2013, and which was signed by the trial court on May 
8, 2013. R017. There is no certificate of mailing for the Temporary Order but it does 
indicate that it would be served upon Tangren. However, as discussed supra, there is no 
evidence in the record that the Temporary Order was ever served on Tangren. The 
Temporary Order found Tangren did not have liability insurance for the fly-in, that the value 
of the policy he was ordered to obtain was $2 million, and ordered Tangren to obtain the 
insurance or he could not have the fly-in as scheduled. R01 7. 
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The Temporary Order in this case does not define the injury to Plaintiff and why it is 
irreparable. UT. R. CIV. P. 65A(b)(2). T he Temporary Order does not set fo rth the reasons 
for its issuance, is non-specific in terms, and fails to describe, in reasonable detail, the act or 
acts sought to be restrained. UT. R. CIV. P . 65A(d). 
As the appkant for the temporary restraining order, Plaintiffs were required to 
establish the requirements of a temporary restraining order. Southern Utah Wilderness at 640. 
Plaintiffs were required to demonstrate 1) irreparable harm, 2) the threatened injury to 
Plaintiffs outweighed any damage to Tangren, 3) the order would not be adverse to the 
public interest, and; 4) there is a substantial likelihood Plaintiffs would prevail on the merits 
of the underlying claims or the Plainti ffs had presented serious issues on the merits that 
would be the subject of further litigation. See, Rule 65A(e). Plaintiffs failed to establish how 
the harm was irreparable, the threatened injury to Plaintiffs outweighed any damage to 
Tangren, failed to address the effect upon the public interest, and failed to allege there was a 
substantial likelihood Plaintiffs would prevail on the merits of its underlying claims against 
Tangren. Id. 
None of the elements required by Rule 65A(e) were addressed by the Temporary 
Order and it constitutes wrongfully issued injunction. Birch Creek at 994-995. The Temporary 
O rder in this case contains conclusory statements and fails to list the reasons for the 
enjoinment. Id. The Temporary Order does not address the standards pursuant to Rule 65A 
and therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law. System Concepts at 429. 
These foregoing procedural deficiencies in this case prohibited Tangren from fully 
realizing the exact nature of the pending proceedings against him. Additionally, based upon 
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the requirements of Rule 65A, the Temporary Order was improperly entered. Therefore, 
when viewed as one large whole, the circumstances of this case warranted setting aside the 
default judgment and Writ of Restitution based upon excusable neglect or as a reason 
justifying relief from said orders pursuant to Rule 60(6 )(1) and (6) . Accordingly, the trial 
court abused its discretion in this matter and the Judgment in this case should be reversed. 
D . The Trial Court Erred By Denying The Motion To Set Aside. 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the trial court failed to further justice by 
relieving T angren of the default judgment and Writ of Restitution in this case. UTAH R. CIV. 
P. 60(6). T his case amounts to excusable neglect based upon the insufficient summons, 
Plaintiffs' failure to abide by Rule 5, the manner in which default was entered, and the entry 
of the wrongful injunction. Further, the Motion to Set Aside was filed within a reasonable 
time of the entry of the default judgment. Id. 
The circumstances of this matter arise to an abuse of discretion on the part of the 
trial court, when it denied the Motion to Set Aside and declined to exercise the equitable 
nature of excusable neglect . .Jones at ir 17. The trial court failed to take into account all 
relevant factors in light of the facts of this case, particularly since setting aside the default 
judgment is justified under the principles of fundamental fairness herein. Id. 
T angren has established excusable neglect and presented evidence to justify the relief. 
.Jones at~ 20. Under the circumstances of this case as described above, Tangren exercised due 
diligence by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances. U:7hite Cap at iI 5. 
Tangren exercised diligence upon realizing default had entered in November of 2013. 
Tangren's actions in this case were sufficiently diligent and responsible, in light of the 
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attendant circumstances herein, which justifies excusing him from the full consequences of 
his neglect. Jones at il 20. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in the denial of the 
Motion to Set Aside and reversal is warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant Rodney Tangren respectfully 
requests the reversal of the denial of the Motion to Set Aside, direct further proceedings, and 
any other such relief this Court determines to be necessary and appropriate. 
DATED this lo~ day of April, 2015. 
OANE PAPPAS WHITE 
Attorney for Rodney Tangren 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH UTAH R. APP. P. 24(f)(l)(C) 
Counsel hereby certifies the Opening Brief of Appellant complies with the type-volume 
limitation: 13,219 words are contained herein, in compliance with UTAH R. APP. P. (f)(l)(A) 
and was determined by the word processing system used to prepare Opening Brief of Appellant. 
DATED this 6th day of April, 2015. 
~ea~~  PAPASWHITE 
Attorney for Rodney Tangren 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify tbat I mailed a true and correct copy, postage pre-paid, of the 
foregoing Opening Brief of Appellant, with attachments, on this 6th day of April, 2015, to the 
following: 
Craig C. Halls 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appeilee 
403 South Main Street 
Blanding, Utah 84511 
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SAN JUAN COUNTY CORPORATION 
LEASE AGREEMENT 
Lease Agreement ("Lease" or "Aareement") made on L 
~• by -,,b~tw~ @~ ,.__r~CL'-7 , Trustee of 
J frllfjru. -1::t:un, ly I Cl'£ f . - (h~reinafter called "Lessor") 
and, '. and , ®~- 7 a-n,u-r,;...,_, ~rasbund -M&-
-- ✓ . .,,- ,. 0 ~ 
,wa.,e (hereinafter called "Lessee"}. 
WITNESSETH: 
That for and in consideration of the sum of One Hundred 
DOLIARS ($100.00), the receipt and sufficiency of which is 
acknowledged, Lessor and Lessee hereby agree that Lessor shall 
lease to Lessee, and Lessee shall lease from Lessor the real 
property described hereinbelow, upon and subject to the terms, 





I ,-, e- 1 I __ . , . , _ , - 1 , r ;r . , , , 
·-·- ---... 
.-,} _._ .. . :..~ 
· .. · ·,. ~-!'i ,~)~iRP.'i .qf·. Lease: The term of tbis Le~s'e sh~ll 
a,p~~ :PJl -~ l I 1991, or upon d•i!.v.ary of p.Q8flffSion, 
.• ' . - ,.. . . ·, 
whkmev~r .-oecurs first, and unless it comes to an end sooner by 
operation of the provisiomi contained herein or by operation of 
law, -shal.l continue for a term which shall terminate on the 
oacurk~ ~fa default by Lessee or on /41, ~' 2090. 
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4. Possession: Lessor and Lessee acknowledge that Lessee 
is currently in possession of the Property and shall continue in 
possession hereafter pursuant to this Agreement. 
5. Rental: Lessee shall pay to Lessor a monthly rent of 
("$ I .S::D · 00 ) due and payable on the 1st day 
• 
of each calendar month (tha "Due Date") beginning with the 
rental payment. In addition each month on 
the sal!le date Lessee shall pay one-twelfth (l/12) of the 
estimated annual taxes and insurance for the then current 
calendar year. For example in 
_._1-991 the estimated annual 
insurance cost is $_d,~~-~Q and the estimated cost for real 
property taxes is $ 9So -~ '-.) During calendar year 1992 each 
monthly payment to Les11or will include an amount equal to the sum 
of one-twelfth (1/12) of each of these estimated annual costs, or 
in 199f the sum of $_L} .. • $~ . ..::,~~ monthly. Thus in 199~ each monthly 
payment made to Lessor shal 1 be $ iil, ?S ~~ being the sum of the 
monthly rent and one-twelfth ( 1/12) of each of the estimated 
annual costs. 
-
All payments shall be made to Lessor at 3/l't, E Ck~ 
. 
ted. 
Ten days prior to .January 
each ca en ar year or as soon thereafter as the estimated annual 
costs for taxes and insurance can be ascertained, Lessor shall 
provide to Lessee the calculated sum to be paid monthly for said 
costs in addition to the $ __ per month rental payment. 
Upon notice Lessee shall increase or decrease the total monthly 
3 
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payment beginning with the first payment due subsequent to the 
notice. If Lessor fails to provide such notice then the monthly 
payment shall continue in the amount paid in the previous 
calendar year until such notice is provided. . Any special taxes 
or assessment which become due during the term hereof shall be 
Lessee upon demand by 
7. t : Lessor shall be 
responsible for paying out of the monthly estimated swn received 
from Lessee pursuant to paragraph 5 all real property tax 
assessed against the Property during the term of the Lease and 
the insurance. 
8. Utilities: 
pay directly to the 
Lessee shall be responsible for and shall 
suppliers all charges for electricity, 
sewage, gas and all other utilities and services used on or in 
connection with the Property during the term of this Lease and 
during any period of occupancy of the Property before or atter 
such term. 
9. Eyents of Default: In any one or more of the following 
cases, or in any one or more of the cases that elsewhere in this 
Lease may be made subject to this provision, Lessor shall have 
just cause to do so and may declare Lessee in default if Lessee: 
(a) neglects to timely perform any of its payments or 
other obligations under this Lease; 
(b) whether vo luntaril y or involuntarily, becomes 
unable to meet its financial obligations as t h e y 
mature; 
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(c) becomes insolvent; or 
(d) vacates the property and leaves it vacant for a 
period in excess of thirty days without prior 
approval from Lessor. 
10. Termination of I&ase Upon Default: In the event of a 
default as described in Section 9 above, Lessor may elect to 
terminate this Lease upon ten (10) days notioe to Lessee and to 
demand and to receive the immediate surrender of the Property as 
well as the immediate payment of all amounts then due from Lessee 
to Lessor by law and under this Lease, without prejudice to all 
such other rights and remedies as may exist by law under this 
Lease, but reserving to Lessee the benefits of Section 11 below 
in a case where they apply. 
11. Lessee's Cure of De;fault: Without prejudice to the 
provisions of this Lease regarding rights and remedies and the 
resolution of claims, controversies, demands or disputes and 
without limiting the concurrent availability of all such 
provisions to Lessor, it Lessor seeks to terminate this Lease 
upon a default in the payment of rent, taxes or other sum payable 
under this Lease or upon any other default which Lessee 
reasonably and promptly can correct, Lessor shall give Lessee ten 
(10} days notice to correct such default, and such notice shall 
not take effect at the end of such ten ( 10) days if Lessee 
corrects the default in the interim. 
5 
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12. Assignment by I',,essee: This Lease is personal to 
Lessee,. and Lessee does __.;._ have the right to assign or transfer 
this Lease. 
13. Assignment by Lessor: This Lease or the paYJilents due 
Lessor hereunder may· be assigned. Lessor has the right to set up 
a collection account and Lessee up(?n notice agrees to make all 
sUbsequent p~ynients to such collection account as directed. 
14. Governing Law: The law applicabl.e to the performance 
of this Lease shall be the law of the State of Utah. 
15. Notioe of Lease: Lessee may record this Lease, or upon 
the request of Lessee, Lessor shall prepare and execute a Notice 
of Lease which Lessee may record at i ta expense. Lessee shall 
deliver a copy of any such recorded Notice of Lease to Lessor. 
16. No other Assy~ances: Lessee makes this Lease in 
reliance upon its provisions, including any amendments, 
supplements and extensions, and not in reliance upon any alleged 
assurances, representations and warranties made by Lessor, or 
Lessor's agents, servants or employees. 
17. 
18. Amendments in Writing: .No alleged modification, 
termination or waiver of this Lease shall be binding unless it is 
set out in writing and signed by the parties hereto. 
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19. Notices: Where this Lease requires notice to be 
given, except where it expressly provides to the contrary, all 
such notices shall be in writing and (except for those that are 
delivered by hand) shall be deemed given when mailed by 
registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, or when sent by 
telegram or cable, addressed to the party or Guarantor entitled 
to receive the notice at his or its address as provided for such 
purpose in this Lease or at such other address as the party or 
Guarantor to receive the notice last may have designated for such 
purpose by notice given to the other party. 
20. Addresses for Notices: The addresses for notices and 
payments are: 
LESSOR: 
3JI 'f €' ~ f),...... ~ wd., 
/....~ ,;~ ...... ., ~- ?°$-1"'7' 
LESSEE: 
3 ~ ~} E C'~$rb-...... l9· J.,· l 
~va,-~..,r 
21 . Attorney Fees: In the event it becomes necessary for 
any party to employ an attorney to enforce the terms of this 
Agreement or protect his rights, the prevailing party shall be 
entitled to reasonable attorney fees and court costs incurred 
thereby. 
22. Brokers: Each party represents to the other that it 
has not utilized the services of any real estate broker in 
connection herewith. 
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- · ,em 6£ -En~t~.r-eiw 1Jefi"2t111MtW'iiih~ 
p,a2w .ga@AA,Wli - I 
IN WI'l'NESS WHEREOF, the parties have exeeuted this Agreement 
as of the date first above written. 
LESSEE: LESSOR: 
STATE OF NEVADA ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF CLARK ) 
on this ~day of 
pereonallYi appeared before me, a 
...---'----' who acknowled~&°'°"t:1:];0<u 
foregoing Lease Agreement. 
STATE OF NEVADA 
COUNTY OF CLARK 
ss: 
On this ~ day of,.,..-t:O~:;::..._,.,_-,---,,_ ----" 
personally anneared before me, cy-'Nota 
___ , who acknow),.edged 
~oregoing Lease. Agreement. I 
8 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF N5VAOA 
· County of Clar!< 
A Petrlcia Crickonberr.er I 
?olntmont E;cp1rr.~ Dec . ..,2 fr. 9., :::-----.!:_:_ . .:.' .. ~ 
E 0G4128 B 797 P 0012 
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ELtSE M. TYRELL, ESQ. 
2 Nevada Bar No: 5531 
TRENT, TYRELL & ASSOCIATES 
3 11920 Southern Highlands 
Parkway, Suite 200 
4 Las Vegas, NevAda 89141 
Phone: (702) 3~2-2210 
5 Fax: (702) 382-9242 
elyse@probatelawlv.com 
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9 In the Matter of ) CASE NO. P-11-071373 
THE EXEMPTION TRUST OF THE ) DEPT: H 














An Intervivos Trust ) 
__________________ ) 
QRDP !Rf!' CQOBT 
Data of Bearing: 08/03/12 
Ti.me o~ Baari119: 9:30 a.m. 
This matter having come on for hearing on the 3rd day of 
August, 2012, based upon the Petition Removal of Successor Trustee, 
tiled by RODNEY TANGREN, which was originally on this court's 
calendar for June 29, 2012. During the June 29th hearing, this 





2012, in an effort to afford her an opportunity to respond to the 
Petition for Removal of Successor Trustee; SHARON TANGREN fISCUS 
having filed an Objection to the Petition for Removal of Successor 
Trustee; RODNEY TANGREN having filed a response to that objection; 
24 





M. TYRELL, ESQ., and her client , RODNEY TANGREN, as wel l as the 
presence of PHILIP VAN ALSTYNE, ESQ., and his client, SHARON 
1 
1 TANGREN rrscos, the parties having discussed the issues raised in 
2 the petition, objection and response; ~he parties having reached 
3 an agreement; the court having heard the statements of counsel and 
4 good cause appear therefor; 
5 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter is 
6 hereby continued until Friday, February 8, 2013, at 9:30 a.m.; and 
7 it is 
8 FURTHER ORDERED that RODNEY TANGREN and SHARON TANGREN FISCOS 
9 a~e hereby directed to drop the pending litigation in the Seate of 
10 Utah; and it is 
11 FURTHER ORDERED that RODNEY TANGREN shall maKe arrangements to 
12 immediately secure a $1,000,000.00 liability insurance policy on 
13 the Trust property and shall provide SHARON TANGREN FISCUS with 
14 evidence of the same; and it is 
15 EURTHER ORDERED that RODNEY TANGREN shall bear the expense 
16 associa~ed with the liability insurance policy and shall make 
17 certain that the premiums are kept current; and it is 
18 FURTHER ORDERED that RODNEY TANGREN and SHARON TANGREN FISCUS, 
19 by and through ELYSE M. TYRELL, ESQ., shall discuss the clean up of 
20 the hazardous waste on the Utah property and shall discuss the 
21 Trust's responsibility associated the cost of the clean up; and it 
22 is 
23 FURTHER ORDERED that SHARON TANGREN FISCUS shall not increase 
24 the rent on the Utah property without giving RODNEY TANGREN 
25 sufficient notice, through ELYSE M. TYRELL, ESQ.; and it is 
26 FURTHER ORDERED that , should the r e need to be an increase 
27 in the rent, SHARON TANGREN FISCUS shall provide RODNEY TANGREN 
28 2 
1 with docwnentation and evidence as to why the increase is 
2 necessary. _ f-






TRENT, TYRELL & ASSOCIATES 
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ITH DISTRICT COURT- MONTICELLO 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TANGREN FAMILY TRUST vs. RODNEY TAN GREN 
CASE NUMBER 120700005 Eviction 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
LYLE R ANDERSON 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff - TANGREN FAMILY TRUST 
Repracotcd by: CRAIG C HALLS 
Dcfcnda.nt- RODNEY TANGREN 
Represented by: CHRISTOPHER G MCANANY 
Trustee - SHARON FISCUS 
Rq,rcscntcd by: CRAIG C HALLS 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOT AL REVENUE AmoUIU Due: 360.00 
Amount Paid: 360.00 
Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT IOK-MORE 
Amount Due: 360.00 
Amount Paid: 360.00 




03--01-12 Case filed 
03-01-12 Judge LYLE R ANDERSON assigned. 
03--01-12 Filed: COMPLAINT 
03--01-12 Fee Account created Total Due: 360.00 
03--01-12 COMPLAINT IOK-MORE Paymc:nt ~cived: 360.00 
No<c: Code Description: COMPLAINT !OK-MORE 
03-12-12 Filed: ANSWER ANSWER 
RODNEY TANGREN 
Printed: 12/03/ 13 10:17:46 Page I 
CASE NUMBER 12070000.5 Eviction 
03-14-12 Filed J"C1Uffl: SUMMONS 
Pany Served: TANGREN, RODNEY 
Seivice Type: Personal 
Service Dale: March 08, 2012 
08-23-12 Filed: MOTION FOR DISMISSAL 
Filed by: HAUS, CRAIG C 
08-23-12 Filed order: ORD.ER OF DISMISSAL 
Judge LYLE R ANDERSON 
Signed August 23, 2012 
08-23-12 Case Disposition is Dismsd w/o prejudice 
Disposition Judge is LYLE R ANDERSON 
Primed: 12/03/ 13 10:17:46 Pngc 2 (hist) 
-" dd d· "D" - r ,n . t 
.: . . i. _ en _ u1n \_;ompla1n., 
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CRAIG C. HALLS #1317 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
333 South Main Street 




lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE TANGREN F AMLIY TRUST, 
SHARON FISCUS, TRUSTEE 
Petitioner, 
COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTION 
AND ORDER OF RESTITUTION. 
vs. 
RODNEY TANG REN, Civil No. 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Respondent. 
COMES NOW, THE TANG REN F AMLIY TRUST and for cause of action alleges as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff is in at all times mentioned is a trust formed in the State of Nevada with 
ownership of property in San Juan County State of Utah. 
2. Defendant at all times mentioned was a resident of the County of San Juan, State 
of Utah. Jurisdiction is appropriate in San Juan County, State of Utah because the 
Defendant lives in San Juan County, State of Utah and the activities, which arc 




-··- - - ·-·---
4. Richard Tangren, Trustee of the Tangren Family Trust entered into a lease 
agreement on February 241h 1994 for the 99 year lease of properties in San Juan 
County (Exhibit A) more particularly described as: 
Parcel I : All that certain lot, piece and parcel of land lying situate and being in 
San Juan County and known as the NE 1/4 NE 1/4, section 12, T27S, R20E, 
SLBM, containing 40 acres, more or less. 
27S 20E 12 000 
Parcel 2: All that certain lot, piece and parcel of land lying situate and being in 
San Juan County and being described as follows: E ½ of the SE 1/4 SE 1/4, SE 
l /4 NE 1/4 SE 1/4, Section 1, T27S, R20E, SLBM. Lots 11 and 12, Section 6; 
Lot 2, Section 7; T27S R2IE, SLBM. Township 37 South, Range 19 East, SLBM, 
Section 16: San Juan County. 
27S 20E 01 7200 
27S 21 E 06 6000 
27 S21E 07 3000 
5. As part of the lease agreement, Respondent, Rodney Tangren, agreed to pay all 
taxes and insurance which may be needed to protect the property, the lessee and 
the owner. (Sec Paragraph 5 and 7 of the lease attached as Exhibit A). 
6. On several occasions in 2011 and 2012 the Petitioner obtained and attempted to 
obtain liability insurance on the premisses and notified Respondent of the cost of 
the coverage. 
7. On several occasions from 2009 to the present Respondent has hosted or allowed 
others to have a "Fly In" at the Cave Man Ranch. The "Fly In" involved several 
aircraft flying into the Ranch for a weekend of airplane games, shooting, and 
socializing. 
8. Some of the participants paid or donated money to the Petitioner or paid camping 
fees for the activity. Respondent has asserted he receives no compensation for 
injunc1ioncomplain1. wpd 2 
the activity. 
9, On May 24 -27, 2013 another activity is planned for the ranch which involves 
aircraft landing on the dirt field at the ranch. The organizer has stated in social 
media that the number of "visitors" expected is approximately 200. 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
10. The activity (aircraft takeoff and landing) exposes the owner to liability if 
someone where to become hurt or an accident were to occur. 
11. The owner is to be protected, at least in part, pursuant to the lease agreement by 
the obtention of insurance. The responsibility for the payment of the insurance is 
to Respondent. The determination of what insurance is required is left to 
Petitioner. 
12. Petitioner has notified that the activities planned are objectionable and should not 
be conducted without the protection of insurance and has requested Respondent to 
pay for such coverage and respondent has refused. 
13. There is no liability insurance in place presently which insures the contemplated 
activity and an activity involving numerous aircraft utilizing the dirt airstrip at 
Cave Man Ranch is scheduled for May 24-27. 
14. To the best of Petitioners knowledge, Respondent is not employed and docs not 
own sufficient property or assets to cover liability if the activities he is allowing 
on the property should result in injury to a participant or guest 
15. Respondents course of conduct in refusing to obtain appropriate insurance and 
injunctioncomplaint wpd 
upon insisting on conducting activities which are dangerous subject the owner to 
extreme liability and are knowing, and willfully in violation of the lease, and 
without legitimate purpose. 
16. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law or otherwise, for the harm or damage 
threatened to be done, by Respondent. Respondent has no ability to ''self insure" 
the potential harm. While many of the issues may be compensated by financial 
award, Respondent is unable to respond in a financial way to the risk, or to 
assume the risk. The Respondent's refusal to pay the premium for the activities 
he is conducting or allowing has no legitimate purpose and is exposing Petitioner 
to a harm for which there is no adequate remedy. 
17. Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm, damage and injury, unless the acts and 
conduct of defendant described above are enjoined . Respondent does not have 
the financial ability to resolve Petitioners complaints short of obtaining insurance 
or discontinuing the activity. 
BREACH OF LEASE 
18. Insurance to protect the owner is provided for in the lease agreement and 
Petitioners have notified Respondent that he must obtain appropriate insurance for 
the "Fly In" activity but Respondent has refused. 
19. Petitioner has notified Respondent of arrears in the payment of fire insurance for 
2011 and Respondent has failed to pay the amount of $592.66. Respondent has 
failed to pay an amount in arrears for 2012 in the amount of $397.10. Respondent 
injunctioncomrlaint.wptl 
has been notified and requests have been made for the payment of $989.76 which 
have remained uncomplied with, 
20. Respondent is responsible for the payment of insurance premiums pursuant to the 
lease. (Paragraphs 5 and 7). 
21. Petitioner is given the authority to obtain appropriate insurance on the properties 
and for liability at the expense of Respondent. (Paragraph 7) Petitioner has 
notified Respondent of the need and increase in insurance obligation and 
Respondent has refused to pay for the additional amounts in breach of the lease 
agreement. 
PRIOR BREACH OF LEASE 
22. In 2011 Petitioner notified Respondent of various breaches of the lease agreement. 
A copy of the notice(s) is provided as exhibit B and C. The violations remained 
uncomplied with and Respondent is in default of the lease agreement in 
accordance with the prior notice. 
23. Respondent was notified of insurance premiums that were not paid and also of an 
increase in the payment to reflect the insurance by letters dated November 5, 201 I 
(Exhibit D) and December 7, 2011 (Exhibit E). 
24. On January 10th, 2012 Defendant was notified that he was in default in the amount 
of $534.75, which constituted the payment for the insurance for September, 
October, November, December and January. Copy of the January 101\ 2012 letter 
is attached hereto as Exhibit r. 
inJunctioncomplaint. wpd 
25. On February 3rd 2012 Defendant was sent a Notice of Termination and Forfeiture 
of Lease and Demand for Delivery of Possession. The notice was sent lo Rodney 
Tangren Caveman Ranch, P.O. Box 1705, Moab, Utah 84532, which is an address 
that had previously been agreed by Rodney Tangren as being the appropriate 
address for service of Notices. Mr. Tangren has been given in excess of ten (10) 
days in which to cure the default in the payment of the insurance owed on the 
property in the amount of $534.75 and failed to do so. (Exhibit G) 
26. Plaintiff has notified Defendant, pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Lease Agreement, 
of the increase of insurance and taxes. Defendant is liable, pursuant to paragraph 
6 for the payment of "any special taxes or assessments which become due during 
the term hereof shall be paid by Lessee upon demand by Lessor" 
27. Defendant has failed, pursuant to paragraph 9 to timely perform his obligation to 
pay taxes and insurance in addition to the lease payments. 
28. Defendant has been notified, pursuant to paragraph 10 of the Lease Agreement, of 
his failure to make the payments or to cure, as provided in paragraph 10, and has 
failed to cure pursuant to the ten (10) day grace period allowed under paragraph 
11. 
29. Under the terms of the Lease Agreement, Plaintiff has the right to recover 
possession of the property for Dcfondants failure to timely pay the rent, taxes and 
insurance, or to cure the default pursuant to the four ( 4) notices attached. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays a restraining order issued as follows: 
inju11cl irm,11111plainl wpJ r, 
------------------- --. - - - --
•--- ...... -~~-......-:c:-••••---, • ..-,,n -•• _, ___ H •9•~ -• __...... ..... ".-~--,.,,. ' .. , - •- ·--•, ,.. --• • • 
1. Enjoining the Respondent from allowing or engaging in the "Fly In" activity 
scheduled for the 24-27 of May, 201 3. 
2, Enjoining Respondent from cn~ai;ing in any futurt activity which CX}'Q!'Cd the 
owner to liability until the appropriate insurance is obtained, 
3. Allowing the Petitioner to obtain appropriate insurance but requiring Respondent 
to pay the cost of the insurance in accordance with the lease. 
4. For plaintiffs cost and expenses incurred in this action, 
5. Ruling that the lease agreement is in default in accordance with the original notice 
of default or alternatively that the agreement is in breach for the current failure to 
obtain. or pay for the current insurance and obtain appropriate insurance. 
6. That the Court enter a Writ of Rcstitut:ion, ordering the Defendant to be removed 
from the property and allowing Petitioners to re-enter and take possession of the 
property. 
7, For such other and further relief as the court may deem proper and just in the 
circumstances. 
Dated this _jg_ Day of {Lt'Jri J 2013. i 
SHARON FISCUS 
inj unct ioncomplain1. wpd 
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CRAIG C. HALLS 
Attorney for Petitioner 
333 South Main Street 
Blanding, Utah 84511 
Telephone: 678-3333 
Bar Counsel No. 1317 
The Order of Court i4 mtcd below: 
Dated: April 23, 2013 /,J Lyle 
04:26: 11 PM Disttl 
TN TiiE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUOJCtAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE TANGREN F AM1L Y TRUST, 10 DAY SUMMONS 
SHARON FISCUS, TRUSTEE 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
RODNEY TANGREN. Civil No. 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Respondents. 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO TIIE ABOVE•NAMED DEFENDANT: 
You are hereby summoned and required to file an answer to the anru:hed Complaint in writing with 
the Clerk of the above--entitled Court at, 296 S Main Monticello, Utah 84535, and to serve upon, or 
mail to Craig C. Halls, Plaintiffs attorney, 333 South Main Street. Blanding, Utah 84511, a copy of 
said answer, within IO days after service of this summons upon you. 
If you fail so to do.judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded in said 
complaint, which has bcc:n fikd with the Clerk of said court and a copy of which is hereto annexed 




1959 Caveman Way 
Moab, UT 84532 
SERVICE COPY 
April 23, 2013 04:26 PM , of 1 
A -, 1 ' -,F.•-, A-1 R r- S . r-,•, db -1 r-1 -,~_ .rt v,,. . · , _ - I , - ~ ,. 1 { ~ -·. • .i_c -~.ei_., .. ~.Uu. 1. .... _._.l .. eturns o__ erv1ce r ile y 
Plaintiff 
50 of S-S 
--- --- -------------· - - -- -- -·· 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
GRAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
)S.S. 
COUNlY OF GRAND) 
,c' ,.r ~ c/~,,. ,r 
I bel1!by make n:cmn of tiefVice and certify that: 
1. I an duly quali6cd and 11:tiq Peace Officer or am a perlOl1 c,ver me aae of 21 ,an and am not a part to the action. 
2. I lftwd ~/4 .. r ~,z ~efendant □ Plaintiff □ Rc.pondc:ot 
□Wimcss O Third Pany O Other _______ _ 
3. Type of frocess; 
□ Summons and Complaint I Verified Petition □ Ex-Parte Protective Order and Verified Petition 
0 Motion & Supplemental Order □ Protective Order□ Beru:h Warrant D Small Claims 
D Temporary~ Order/Request for Temporary Protective Order )lll;Order to Show Cause 
0 Bench Warrant poticc of Hearing for /, &4-.,<- ,!(':,J--,L.:z-~,,,.-?-c-
□ Noticcoflncomins Withholding □ Declaration of ________ □ Subpoena 
□ Notice of Hearing on Motion for Temporary Orders □ Motion for Temporary Ordtts 
OcheJ- a, ,(4t:d' .e/d, /;,<'-< f"H ,L -~ ,k.a•.,L. (?/ /c~f~ 
4. llttwdaidproeeaby. 
Delivcrina a copy to aid individual pcnonally at: ;z $" 7,e,/4' I ,!?,C) G~ ~ 
L??t?~6 wr -'?:7" f 3z:. . 
Leaving a copy with: ______ .,.-______ a suitable person over the age of 14 and n:aidcs 
with the Dcfmdam at bis/bee uormal place of abode 
at 
----------------------------- --
Serving a Company or Corporation: _________ _ ___________ _ 
by lea-vin8 a copy with. _ _ _____ location _ _ _ _____ _ 
s. Dau llffelwd: 1 ~-/ b .2012-. Da&c Served: / p>✓6 201 _1:_ Time S«\'lld ;f _, <;:o 
6. Upon tefVmi said process. I cndoncd !he dale aid pl.au of scr\'iu and my name on wd copy and 8ho'wcd-me ori,inal u, me 
J)CtlOG ICIWd. 
7 Case Number: __ Setvice fee: ____ _ 
I catify tjJat the fOICgC>ina it uue and co,~ect that · -~ is euailed on tht _/__f, _day of 
_ $<~ Year2<Y_i. _ 
~ -- ,.. ---
_pf=i-Dcputy-~S .... bcri--,._ff._,..._ □ Shcri1r - -
/""□ Police Offic« □ Office Admiruatrarion 
S11b.la'ibed ud mora Mfore ma tllb __ da)' ot _ _ _ Year __ 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
GRAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
STATE Of UI'AH ) 
)S.S. 
COUNTY OF GllAND ) 
I bet'eby make rcmm of ICtVicc and certify lhat: 
I. I am duly qualified and ICtiag Peace Oftictr or am II per,on over rbe age of 21 yun and am not a pan IO lbc action. 
2. 1..-wd K<>4t/£'( 7'4N(:,/q£N □ Ddcndanl O PWmilf ~ 
OWimca C Third Party □ Odicr. _______ _ 
3. Typoof Proc:eu: 
i{ Summons and Complaint □ Ex-Pa.rte Proicctivc Order and Verified Petition 
D Motion & Supplemental Order □ Protective Order□ Bcoch warrant □ Small Claims 
D Order to Show Cause □ Bench Wammt □ Notice of Hearing for__,,,,_ ______ _ 
□ Notice of Incoming Withholding □ Declaration of_=------ □ Subpoena 
□ Notice of Hearing on Motion for Temponuy Orders □ Motion for Tcmpomy Orders 
Other ______________ _ 
4. I tencd tal4 procas by: 
Deli wring a copy to said iadividm.l pcnonally at: / 'J St:/ CAv£M ~ W A-'-f 
J110A-8 J wt g %3 ::z.. 
I...eaviJlg a copy with:._~---,-~-c:---:-------a su.iublc pcr:soa over the age of 14 and n:s:idca 
with the Defendant at b.is/bor normal place of abode 
at. ____ _ _______ __________________ _ 
SemQSaCompaoyorCcuporation: _ ____ _ _ _ _____________ _ 
by lcavins a copy with _______ locttion. _ ___ ____ _ 
5. Date~ <./-30 .201~ Date Served.: lf-.30 201 :3_ Time Saved 12-S'f 
6. Upon IICt'<i.q &aid process. I mdoned the date and place of 5CfV1CC and my name on Aid copy and showed the orig.inal 10 the 
pcBOn~ 
1. Case Numbc:r: _ __ _ Service Fee: ____ _ 
3o day of 
□ Police Offic« 0 Office Adminismltioo 
Sul,tcrtNd and moni bd'Oft m, dl.ll __ day of ___ Yau-__ 
Nowy PuhUc 
A j -, 1 "G" T R . . 0 d _cic..1enG·Ln11 -- emporary estra1n1ng r er 
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CRAIG C. HALLS # 1317 
333 South Main Street 
Blanding, Utah 84511 
Telephone: (435)678-3333 
Facsimile: (435)678-3330 
Attorney for Petitioners 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SAN JUAN COUNTY 
THE TANGREN FAMILY TRUST, 





ORDER ON TEMPORARY ORDERS 




This matter came on for hearing on the 6th day of May, 2013. The Tangren Family Trmt 
was present and represented by Sharon Fiscus, Trustee and Craig Halls attorney for the Trust and 
the Trustee. Rodney Tangren was present and represented himself. The Court having heard 
testimony and proffer of the parties with regard with the situation on insurance, and having 
reviewed the lease, and an Order of the Nevada Court, finds that: 
1. Rodney Tangren does not have li abili ty insurance for the use of the air strip, 
fly ing activ ities, skydiv ing activities or for charter or flights into Caveman Ranch. 
2. The Court finds that Rodney Tangren may have homeowners insurance on the 
Lodge and that insurance does not protect a ll liab ili ty for all activities. 
3. The Court finds that the va lue of the Ranch, as expressed by Rodney Tangren, 
1 
ta ngren.ord.temp.wpd 
May 08, 2013 03:22 PM 1 c,i 2 
is $2_,000,000. 
4. The Court finds that it is reasonable to order Rodney Tangren to cease and 
desist himself or through any other party from any fly-in activity, especially that scheduled for 
the Caveman Ranch on May 24th through 27th and from any further use of the airstrip, the use of 
the Caveman Ranch as a destination, or drop zone for skydiving activities and for other charter 
or activities involving guests until liability insurance is obtained. 
WHEREFORE: The Court does hereby order that Rodney Tangren is enjoined 
from organizing or allowing the use of the airstrip at Caveman Ranch, or the landing of aircraft, 
and from any other airstrip activities, from skydiving activities or from any other use of the 
airstrip by any other carrier or aircraft company until he has obtained and provided the Trustee 
with proof of liability insurance covering the entire property in an amount at least equal to 
$2,000,000. 
This order means that Mr. Tangren shall not make arrangements himself or allow 
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7TH DISTRICT COURT- MONTICELLO 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
APPEALED: CASE #20140938 
THE TANGREN FAMI LY TRUST vs . RODNEY TANGREN 
CASE NUMBER 130700012 Contracts 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
LYLE R ANDERSON 
PARTIES 
ACCOUNT 
Plaintiff - THE TANGREN FAMILY TRUST 
Represented by : CRAIG C HALLS 
Plaintiff - SHARON FISCUS 
Represented by: CRAIG C HALLS 
Def endant - RODNEY TANGREN 
Represented by : JOANE P WHITE 
SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE J>..rnount Due: 
Amount Paid : 
Credit: 
Balance : 




REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT 





596 . 86 
596 . 86 
0 . 00 
0 . 00 
30 0 .00 
0 . 00 
0.00 
300 . 00 
NO AMT 
360.00 
360 . 00 
0 .00 
0 .00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit : 
Balance : 
10 . 00 
10.00 
0 . 00 
0 . 00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE : POSTAGE-COPIES 
Amount Due : 1 . 86 
Amount Paid: 1 . 86 
Amount Credit : 0 . 00 
Frinted : 04/06/15 08 :13 :04 Page 1 
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Balance : 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid : 
A.mount Credit: 
Balance : 
0 . 00 
225 . 00 
225 . 00 
0 . 00 
0.00 
BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE : CASH BOND : Appeals 
Posted By : JOANE P WHITE 
PROCEEDINGS 
04 -23-13 Filed : Complaint 








300 . 00 
04 -23 - 13 Filed : Other Proposed : Order (Proposed) 
04-23-13 Case f i led 
04 - 23- 13 Fee Account created Total Due : 
04-23 - 13 COMPLAINT - NO AMT s Payment Received: 
04-23 -13 Judge LYLE R ANDERSON assigned . 
360.00 
360.00 
04-23 - 13 Filed : Other Proposed : Summons - To Issue (Proposed) 
04-23-13 Filed order : Order 
Judge LYLE R ANDERSON 
Signed April 23, 2013 
04-23-13 Issued: Summons - To Issue 
Judge LYLE R ANDERSON 
04-23-13 TEMPORARY ORDERS scheduled on May 06, 2013 at 09 : 30 AM with 
Judge ANDERSON. 
05 -02 - 13 ?iled return : Return of Service 
Party Served: RODNEY TANGREN 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: April 30 , 2013 
05 -06 - 13 Minute Entry - Minutes for TEMPORARY ORDERS HEARING 
J udge : LYLE R ANDERSON 
Clerk: jennifer 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s): SHARON FISCUS 
Defendant(s): RODNEY TANGREN 
Printed: 04/06/15 08 :13 : 0 5 Page 2 
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CASE NUMBER 130700012 Contracts 
Plaintiff ' s Attorney(s) CRAIG C HALLS 
Audio 
Tape Count: 10:03-10 : 36 
HEARING 
This matter is before the court for Temporary Orders . 
Mr. Halls proffers . 
Mr. Tangren proffers . 
The court inquires as to whether this matter will be resolved in 
the Nevada Courts or in the Utah Courts . 
Mr . Halls states the case in Nevada was only to handle the Trust . 
There i s no case pending in Nevada at this time . 
The court determines the insurance coverage is not adequate for 
what the Nevada court was requiring. The issues regarding the 
lease on the property should be determined by the Utah Courts and 
not the Nevada Courts . 
Mr. Tangren is to carry $2 million in coverage for the propercy . 
Mr. Halls to prepare t he order. 
05 - 07-13 ?iled: Other Proposed : Order (Proposed) Tempora~y Orders 
05-08-13 Filed order: Order Temporary Orders 
Judge LYLE R ANDERSON 
Signed May 08, 2013 
07-03 -13 ?iled : Other Proposed :Order (Proposed) of Judgmen t 
07-03 - 13 Filed: Other Proposed :Writ of Restitution (Proposed) 
07-03-13 ?iled: Return of Electronic No t ificacion 
07-03-13 ? iled: Other - Declined to Sign Writ of Restitution (Proposed) 
07 -03-13 Note : Judgement has not been entered 
07 - 03 - 13 ?iled : Other - Declined to Sign Order (Proposed) of Judgment 
07 - 03-13 No te : No default cert ificate has been submitted or entered on 
Princed : 04/06/ 1 5 08 :13 : 05 Page 3 
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this case . The summons was not filed with the return of 
service. 
07-03-13 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification 
07-03-13 Filed : Return of Elec tronic Notification 
07-10-13 Filed return : Summons on Return 
Party Served : RODNEY TANGREN 
Service Type : Personal 
Service Date: April 30, 2013 
07-10 - 13 Fi led return : Return of Service upon RODNEY TANGERN for 
Party Served : RODNEY TANGREN 
Service Type : Personal 
Service Date : April 30, 2013 
07-10-13 Filed: Other Proposed :Default Certificate (Proposed) 
07-10-13 Filed : Default Certificate 
07-10- 13 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification 
07 - 10 - 13 Filed : Other Proposed :Writ of Restitut ion (Proposed) 
07 - 10- 13 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification 
07-22-13 Filed : Other - Dec l ined to Sign Writ of Restitution (Proposed) 
07-22 - 13 Note: The Wri t of Restitution refers to a Judgment, but no 
judgment has been signed and no judgment has been 
submitted. 
07-22 - 13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
09-03-13 Filed : Order (Proposed) of Judgment 
09- 03-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
09-05 - 13 Case Disposition is Judgment 
Disposition Judge is LYLE R ANDERSON 
09-05-13 Filed order : Order of Judgment 
J udge LYLE R ANDERSON 
Signed September 05, 2013 
09 - 05 - 13 Filed : Return of Electronic Notifica t ion 
09-05-13 DETERMINE DAMAGES scheduled on October 07, 2013 at 01:00 PM 
with Judge ANDERSON. 
G9 - 05 - 13 Noce: DETERMINE DAMAGES calendar modified. 
09-12 - 13 Fi led : Writ of Restitution (Proposed) 
09-12 - 13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
09-16 - 13 Issued : Writ of Restitut i on 
J udge LYLE R ANDERSON 
09 - 16-13 ? iled: Return of Elec tronic Notification 
10- 02-13 ?iled : Notice of Hearing 
Printed : 04 /06/15 08 :13:0 5 Page 4 
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10-02-13 Fi led: Return of Electronic Not i fication 
10- 02-13 DETERMINE DAMAGES scheduled on November 04, 2013 at 09 : 30 AM 
with Judge ANDERSON. 
10 - 14-13 Filed : Motion Order to Show Cause 
?iled by : THE TANGREN FAMILY TRUST, 
10- 14- 13 Fi led : Affidavit of Craig C . Halls 
10-14-13 Filed: Order (Proposed) to Show Cause 
10-14-13 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification 
10-15 - 13 Filed order : Order to Show Cause 
Judge LYLE R ANDERSON 
Signed October 15, 2013 
10- 15- 13 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification 
10-22-13 ?iled return : Return of Service 
Party Served : RODNEY TANGREN 
Service Type : Personal 
Service Date : October 16, 2013 
10- 22 - 13 ?iled: Return of Electroni c Notification 
11-04-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for DETERMI NE DAMAGES & OSC 
Judge : LYLE R ANDERSON 
Clerk: pamelaab 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s) : SHARON FISCUS 
Defendant(s) : RODNEY TANGREN 
Plaintiff ' s Attorney(s) : CRAIG C HALLS 
Audio 
Tape Count : 10 : 38 
HEARING 
Sharon Fiscus is sworn and examined by Mr. Halls . Plaintiff ' s 
exhibit #1 Affidaivt ; Plaintiff exhibit #2 General Liability Policy 
and Exhibit #3 Lease Agreement - offered and received. 
Mr . Rodney Tangren is sworn a nd examined by Mr. Halls . Mr . Tang1·en 
testifies on his behalf. 
Keith McBeth i s sworn and examined by Mr . Tangren . Mr. Halls 
Printed : 04/06/15 08 : 13:05 Page 5 
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cross examines . Mr. Tangre n redirects. 
Defendant Exhibit #4 Certificate of Insurance offered and 
received . 
Ms . Fiscus retakes the stand . She is examined and cross examined . 
Mr . Halls gives his closing argument . He asks for his damages and 
that Mr . Tangren be found in contempt . Mr . Tangren gives his 
argument . 
Court finds that Mr . Tangren owes the trust $989 . 76 and the 
attorneys fees . Court finds him in contempt of cou rt . Mr. Halls 
asks for a find of $1000 . Court will not impose a penalty. 
1 1 -04-13 Filed : Exhibit List 











Certificate of Service 
Order (Proposed) on Order to Show Cause 
Judgment (Proposed) 
Return of Electronic Notification 
Revised Certificate of Service (I put the wrong date or. 
::he last one) 
11- 25-13 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification 
11-26-13 Filed : TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 11-04-2013 
11-27- 13 ?iled: Appearance of Counsel Appearance of Counsel 
11-27-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
12-02 -13 ~iled judgment : Judgment 
Judge LYLE R ANDERSON 
Signed December 02, 2013 
12-02-13 Judgment #1 Entered$ 6063 . 51 
Creditor: THE TANGREN F.~1ILY TRUST 
Debtor: RODNEY TANGRE!J 
4,618 . 75 AttorneyFees 
360 . 00 Fi lingFee s 
95 . 00 ProcServFee 
989 . 76 Principal 
6,063 .51 Judgment Grand Total 
12-02-13 riled order: Order on Order to Show Cause 
Judge LYLE R ANDERSON 
Printed: 04/06/15 08 :1 3 : 05 Page 6 
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Signed December 02, 2013 
12-02 - 13 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification 
12-02-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
12-02-13 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 11 - 04-2013 
12-03 - 13 Filed : Motion to Set AsideOrder of Judgment and Writ of 
Restitution 
Filed by: TANGREN, RODNEY 
12-03-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
12-03-13 Filed : Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Oreder of 
Judgment and Writ o f Restitution 
12-03-13 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification 
12-03-13 Filed: Affidavit/Declaration Affidavit of Rodney Tangren 
12-03- 13 Filed : Affidavit/Declaration Affidavit of Hunter Tangren 
12-03-13 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification 
12-03-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
12-03- 13 Filed: Exhibit List Exhibits 
12 -03 - 13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
12-20-13 Filed : Reply Response in Opposition to Motion to Set Aside 
Order of Judgment and Writ of Restitution 
12-20-13 Filed : Exhibit List Exhibit A 
12-20-13 Filed : Exhibit List Exhi bit B 
12-20-13 Filed : Exhibit List Exhibit C 
12-20-13 Filed : Exhibit List Exhibit D 
12-20-13 Filed : Exhibit List Exhibit E 
12- 20-13 Filed : Exhibit List Exhibit F 
12 - 20 - 13 Filed: Exhibit List Exhibit G 
12-20-13 : iled : Exhibit Lis t Exhibit H 
12- 20-13 Filed : Re turn of Electronic Notification 
01 - 13 -14 Filed: Reply to Plaintiffs Response in Oppos ition to Defendants 
Motion to Set Aside Order of Judgment and Writ of Restitu t ion 
01-13-14 Filed : Return of Electronic Not ification 
02-06-14 Filed : Request for Hearing 
02-06-14 :ciled : Recurn of Electronic Notification 
02-07-14 ORAL ARGUMENT ON MOTION scheduled on Febr uary 24 , 2014 at 03:00 
PM with Judge ANDERSON. 
02-07-1 4 Notice - NOTICE for Case 130700012 ID 15748041 
ORAL ARGUMENT ON MOTION is scheduled . 
Date : 02/24/2014 
Time: 03 : 00 p . m. 
Printed : 04/06/ 15 08 :13 : 05 Page 7 
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Before Judge : LYLE R ANDERSON 
02-07-14 Filed : Notice for Case 130700012 ID 15748041 
02 - 24 - 14 FURTHER HEARING ON MOTION scheduled on March 11, 2014 at 02 : 00 
PM with Judge ANDERSON . 
02-24-14 Minute Entry - Minutes fer ORJl.-L ARGUMENT 
Judge : LYLE R ANDERSON 
Clerk: pamelaab 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s) : SHARON FISCUS 
Defendant(s): RODNEY TANGREN 
Plaintiff ' s Attorney(s): CRAIG C HALLS 
Defendant ' s Attorney(s) : JOANE P WHITE 
Audio 
Tape Count : 3:03 
HEARING 
Ms . White gives her arguments to the court . Mr . Halls gives his 
argument. Ms. White responds with further argument . 
Court gives it ' s findings . Court would like to hear in person 
from witnesses for the parties before a decision is made . 
Matter is cont inued for further hearing to March 11, 2014 at 2:00 
pm. 
Mr. Halls inquires about the Writ of Restitution that h as been 
served . Mr . Tangren would like to go back to the property toge~ 
some more of his clothes . Court would like for him to wait u~t il 
the next hearing takes place. 
FURTH~R HEARING ON MOTION is scheduled . 
Date: 03/11/2014 
Time: 02 : 00 p.m. 
Before Judge: LYLE R ANDEP-SON 
03- 11- 14 Received: March 11, 2014 
Container: 10 day SuITLmons (Pltfl Location : locked drawer 
03 - 11 - 14 Rece ~ved : March 11, 2014 
Printed : 04/06/15 08 :13 :06 Page 8 
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Container : Return of Service (Pltf) Location: locked drawer 
03-11-14 Received : March 11, 2014 
Container: Return of Service by Art Hines 
locked drawer 
03-11-14 Received : March 11, 2014 
(Def) Location: 
Contai ner: Service copy of SuITL~ons and Order (Def) Location: 
locked drawer 
03-11-14 Minute Entry - Minutes for FURTHER HEARING ON MOTION 
Judge : LYLE R ANDERSON 
Clerk: conniea 
PRESENT 
Defendant(s) : RODNEY TANGREN 
Plaintiff ' s Attorney(s) CRAIG C HALLS 
Defendant's Attorney(s) JOANE? WHITE 
Audio 
Tape Count: 2:04:00 
HEARING 
COUNT : 2:04 : 00 
This matter is before the court to take evidence regarding ser vice 
on a motion to set aside judgment . 
2:04:51 Mr. Halls asks that witnesses be excluded and cour t grants 
the same . Sh awn Chapman is called, sworn and examined by Mr. 
Halls. 
Exhibit 1 (Return of Service), Exhibit 2 (10 day Summons) and 
Exhibit 3 (Complaint packet that was served) are o ffered and 
received. 
2 : 15 : 04 Ms. White cross - examines. Exhibit 4 (Service copy of 
Sum.~ons and copy of Order) is offered and r eceived . Exhibit S 
(Recurn of Service by Art Hines) i s offered and rece i ved. 
2 : 25 : 58 Mr . Hal l s redi rects . Ms . White recross - examines . 
2 : 27 : 26 Rodney Ta ngren is called, sworn and examined by Mr. Halls . 
Princed: 04/06/15 08 :13:06 Page 9 
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Exhibit 6 (transcript of 11/4/13) is offered. Ms . White objects . 
Page 11 i s only considered as evidence (received) . 
Exhibit 7 (certified copy of Nevada transcript) is offered and 
received. 
2 : 43 : 27 Ms. White cross-examines and also conducts direct 
examination . 
2 : 57:49 Mr . Halls doesn ' t have any other witnesses . 
2 : 58 : 08 Hunter Shelby Tangren is called, sworn and examined by Ms. 
White . 
3:02:54 Mr . Halls cross-examines . The parties have no more 
evidence to present. 
3:05 : 43 Mr. Hal l s gives his sum.rnary followed by Ms . White . 
3:14 : 20 The court finds that the summons and complaint were served 
on Rodney Tangren by Shawn Chapman. The court questions Mr . Halls 
about issuing only a 10 days summons to answer the complaint. Mr. 
Halls was expecting Mr . 
Tangren to have to answer in a shortened period of time . Mr. 
Halls considers this to be similar to an unlawful detainer action . 
The court has questions about the authority of Mr . Halls to give 10 
days time to Mr . 
Tangren to answer the complaint without getting permission from 
the court . The ccurt will consider memoranda filed by the parties 
and wi ll take this matter unde~ advisement . 
3 :36:11 Mr . Halls asks for Exhibit 3 to be returned t o him and Ms. 
Whi te objects. The court does not return the exhibit. 
3 : 37 : 00 Mr . Hall s has 28 jays to file his memorandum and Ms . White 
has 14 days to respond . 
End t ime 3:37 :56 
03 - 12 - 14 Received : March 12 , 2014 
Container : Complaint p acket that was served Location : 
Printed : 0 4 /06/ 15 08:13 : 06 Page 10 
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03-12 - 14 Received : March 12, 2014 
Container : Transcript of 11/4/13 - only page 11 Location : 
03-12 - 14 Received : March 12, 2014 
Container: Certified copy of Nevada transcript Location: 
03-12-14 Filed : Exhib it List 
03 - 12- 14 Notice - Final Exhibit List 
03-28- 14 Fee Account created Total Due: 10 . 00 
03-28-14 Fee Account created Total Due : 1. 86 
03 - 28-14 AUDIO TAPE COPY Payment Received : 10 . 00 
Note: POSTAGE-COPIES 
03 - 28-14 POSTAGE- COPIES Payment Received : 1. 86 
04 - 02-14 Filed : Request for CD 
04-28-1 4 Filed: Reply Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Brief on 
10 - Day Summons 
04-28- 14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
04- 29-14 Filed : Brief on 10-day Summons 
04 - 29-14 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification 
05-02 - 14 Filed : Reply to Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
10-Day Summons 
05 - 02 - 14 ?iled : Return of Electronic Notification 
05-27- 14 Filed : Notice to Submit for Decision 
05-27 - 14 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification 
08-13-14 Filed order : Ruling on Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judge LYLE R ANDERSON 
Signed August 13, 2014 
Brief or_ 
08-20-14 Filed: Order (Proposed) Denying Motion to Sec Aside Judgment 
08-20-1 4 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
08 - 20-14 Filed: Other - Unsigned Order (Proposed) Denying Motion to Set 
Aside Judi;ment 
08-20-14 No te : No proof of service to defendan t . L Page 435-259-1350 
08 - 20-14 Filec : Return of Electronic Notification 
08 -28-14 ?iled: Notice of Proposed Order Denying Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment 
08- 28-14 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification 
09-10 - 14 Fi l ed: Or der (Proposedi Denying Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
09-10 - 14 Fi led : Return of Electronic Notificat ion 
09 - 11 - 14 Filed : Request/No t ice to Submi.t 
09 - 11-14 ?iled: Return o f Electronic Noti fication 
09-15-14 ?iled o rder : Order Denyi ng Motion to Set As i de Judgment 
Printed : 04/06/ 1 5 08 : 13 :07 Page 11 
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Judge LYLE R ANDERSON 
Signed September 15, 2014 
09-15-14 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification 
10-09-14 Filed: Motion for Attorney Fees 
File d by: FISCUS, SHARON 
10-09-14 Filed: Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs by Craig C. Halls 
10- 09-14 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification 
10- 14-14 Filed: Notice of Appeal - Civil Notice of Appeal 
10-14- 14 Fee Account created Total Due : 225 . 00 
10-14 - 14 APPEAL Payment Received: 225 . 00 
10 - 14-14 Filed : Return of Electronic Notification 
10- 15-14 Note: Called attorney regarding cost bond . They will be 
sending it today . 
10-15- 14 Nace: Notice of Appeal emailed to the Supreme Court . 
10-1 6- 14 Bond Account created Total Due: 300.00 
10-16-14 Bond Posted Payment Received: 300 . 00 
Note: Mail Payment; 
10-17- 14 Filed : Response in Opposition to Motion for Attorneys Fees 
10 - 17-14 ?iled: Return of Electronic Notification 
10-22 -14 Note : Appealed : Case #20140938 
11-20- 14 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 02-24 - 2014 
11-20-14 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 03-11 - 2014 
11-24-14 Note : Transcripts Received and are i n Vault 
12-02 - 14 Filed : Notice of Record Index Transmitted to Utah State Appeals 
with Certified Mail Receipt 
12- 08-14 Filed re t urn : Ret urn 
Party Served: UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Service Type : Mail 
Service Date : December 04, 2014 
02-04-15 Filec : TR..l>,NSCRIPT for Hearing of 05-06-2013 
02 -17-15 Filed : Order from Utah Court of Appeals granting motion to 
supplement the record 
02-25 -1 5 Filed : Return Recept for Certified Mail 
03 - 12-15 ?ilec: Or der (Proposed) To Continue 
03-12-15 ?ilec: Ret~rn of Electronic Noti fica tion 
03-12 - 15 Filed: Other - Unsigned Order (Proposed) To Continue 
03 - 12-15 Note: This order is filed in a Monticello case 130700012 
instead of in Carbon County. Jana 
03-12 - 15 Filed : Re~~rn of Electronic Notification 
Printed: 04/0E/15 08 :13:07 ? age 12 
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'ORI)_~R OF JUDGMENT 
Case Number 130700012 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
The-Default of the Defendant in this matter having been entered by the Court upon 
Defendants default, the Court hereby finds the Defendant was in Default under the terms of the 
Lease dated February 22, 1994 and that the Plaintiffs gave appropriate notice to the Defendant to 
cure said default wh ich the Defendants have not done and so thereby they are entitl ed to an Writ 
o f Restitution restoring them to the possess ion of the properties. Additional ly this maner is set 
for a hearing to determine damages. Said hearing to be held on the _ _ day of 
______ , 2013, 
CRAIG C. HALLS # 1317 
333 South Main Street 
Blanding, Utah 84511 
Telephone: (435)678-3333 
Facsimile: (435)678-3330 .,J'.6:'. .t.i ., 
Attorney for Plaintiff "-~ •t;. -~D 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE S~ AT~ ,€>F ~'Ji.t 
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DIS'FRIC~ 
SAN JUAN G:OUNTY~.;· .. . f" 
··, 
TANGREN FAMILY TRUST · WRIT, OF RESTITUTION 




RODNEY TAN GREN 
De fen dan t( s) 
Case Number I 30700012 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
TO THE SHERIFF OF SAN JUAN COUNTY: 
The Court having entered the Order of Judgment in this case allow ing a Writ of 
Restitution, pursuant to the Defaul t of th~ Defendant. The Plaintiff, the Tangren Family Trust 
and Sharon Fiscus Trustee has recovered a Judgment against the Defendant, Rodney Tangren of 
Caveman Ranch. Box 1705, Moab. Utah ii1 an ev iction action in the Seventh Judicial District 
Court in and for San Juan County, State of Utah dated __ day of , 2013. 
-------
The Court hereby orders restitution of the fol lowing described property to wit: 
Parcel I : Ail that certain lot, piece and parcel of land lying si1uate and 
rei1~g i1 , San Juan Coumy nnd knovvn as the NE 1/4 NE l/4, section 12, T27S, 
R20E, SLBM, conta in ing 40 acres, more or less. 
27S 20E 12 000 
Parcel 2: All that certain lot, piece and parcel of land lying situate and 
being in San Juan County and being described as fo llows: E ½ of the SE 1/4 SE 
1/4, SE 1/4 NE 1/4 SE 1/4, Section 1, T27S, R20E, SLBM. Lots 11 and 12, 
Section 6; Lot 2, Section 7; T27S R2 IE, SLBM, Township 37 South, Range 19 
East, SLBM, Section 16: San Juan County. _fi~,. 
27S 20£ 01 7200 ·~- . } 
27S21E066000 .\ -r, ' 
27 S21 E 07 3000 -~·=" ;,:• 1~, ;· 
.,· 1 
You are hereby commanded to immediately rJ!hove the Qifendant, Rodney Tangren, 
• · ·1 ·~; ·~-
I 
from the said premises and to restore the Plaintiffs, the Tangren Family Trust and Sharon Fiscus 
.:;, 
Trustee, to the possession of the p,·0pe1ty. You are fu1ther commanded to remove from said 
premises all personal property not the property of the Plaintiff, and to store and dispose the same 
according to Law and to make due return of this Writ with in 10 days. 
• 
CRAIG C. HALLS # 1317 
333 South Main Street 
Blanding, Utah 84511 
Telephone: (435)678-3333 
Facsimile: (435)678-3330 .-.;Jf -.~r,f {,,,. •/(., Attorney for Plaintiff ~ '·· 
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CERTIFICATE OF DEFAULT 
' -.. · :- , 
JUDGMENT 
Case Number 130700012 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
DEFAULT 
In this action. Rodney Tangren, hav ing been regularly served with summons and 
complaint, and having fai led to answer, and the time allowed by law for response having expired, 
the default of said Defendant is he,·eby entered according to law. 
• 
CRAIG C. HALLS #I 317 
333 South Main Street 
Blanding, Utah 845 11 
Telephone: (435)678-3333 
Facsimile: (435)678-3330 r~ · 
Attorney for Plaintiff ~- Jl 
-h \., :t ,, 
., ' 
DISTRICT couRT OF THE s:ri\.'TE,<t>F \,Tllrn ~ 11" SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISJJRIC 1) 
SAN JUAN GOUNTY1i~. ,_/ 
, • ,_,. ¥·;;,.:::: . -
: .. , 
TANGREN FAMILY TRUST WR;g OF RESTITUTION 







· Case Number 1307000 I 2 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
TO THE SHERIFF OF SAN JU/\N COUNTY: 
The Court hav ing entered the Order of Judgment in this case allowing a Writ of 
Restitution, pursuant to the Default of the Defendant. The Plaintiff, the Tangren Family Trust 
and Sharon Fiscus Trustee has recovered a Judgment against the Defendant, Rodney Tangren of 
Caveman Ranch, Box 1705, Moab, Utah in an eviction action in the Seventh Judicial District 
Court in and for San Juan County, State of Utah dated __ day of , 20 13. 
-------
The Court hereby orders restitution of the fo llowing described property to wit: 
Parce l 1: Al l that certain lot, piece and parcel of land lying siwate and 
being in San Juan County and known as the NE 1/4 NE 1/4, section i2, T27S, 
R20E, SLBM, containing 40 acres, more or less. 
27S 20E 12 000 
Parcel 2: All that certain lot, piece and parcel of land lying situate and 
being in San Juan County and being described as follows: E ½ of the SE 1/4 SE 
1/4, SE 1/4 NE 1/4 SE 1/4, Section 1, T27S, R20E, SLBM. Lots 11 and 12, 
Section 6; Lot 2, Section 7; T27S R21 E, SLBM, Township 37 South, Range 19 
East, SLBM, Section 16: San Juan County. ,,,;\~!, -t; )' 
27S 20E 0 I 7200 -~ 1 
27S 21 E 06 6000 /\,{/> ~...,  .i 
27 S2 l E 07 3000 f!· · ~· -l.~ 
-,~-: 'i-
;_ •✓.:."' • -$ 
.. •.. ., ... 
You are hereby commanded to immediately rerh'ove tf\9. J?e'fendant, Rodney Tangren, 
•' 'jf 
from the said premises and to restore the Plau:itiffs_, the Tangren Family Trust and Sharon Fiscus 
• '\, I \ ~.\ ~ 
Trustee, to the possession of the property . . You are further commanded to remove from said 
premises all personal property not the property of the Plaintiff, and to store and dispose the same 
. ; ... ~ '·"". 
according to Law and to make due returl).ofthis Writ within 10 days. 
·-
CRAIG C. HALLS # 1317 
333 South Main Street 
Blanding, Utah 845 I 1 
Telephone: (435)678-3333 
Facsimile: (435)678-3330 




i-. x~ J 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE S~'D~Tlf~OF ·: ~  
SEVENTH JUDICIA!, D1'&})RIC!1f> 
SAN JUAN COUNTY 4). -.il 
TANGREN FAMILY TRUST 





. •· ORQ~R OF JUDGMENT 
). 
!;.' 
Case Number 130700012 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
The pefauit of the Defendant in this matter having been entered by the Court upon 
Defendants default, the Cou1t hereby finds the Defendant was in Default under the terms of the 
Lease dated February 22, 1994 and that the Plaintiffs gave appropriate notice to the Defendant to 
cure said default which the Defendants have not done and so thereby they are entitled to an Writ 
of Restitution restoring them to the possession of the properties. Addit ionally this maner is ser 
for a hearing to determine damages. Sa id hearing to be held on the _ _ day of 
------
, 2013. 
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RULING ON MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE DEFAULT 
Case No. 130700012 
This court has previously informed the parties that it doee 
not credit the t estimony of defendant Rodney Tangren that l) he was 
not actually served with the summons and complaint, and 2) he was 
so confused by multiple proceedings before this court that he did 
not understand the need to answer the complaint. From the evidence 
presented, it is clear to this court that defendant was properly 
served with the summons and complaint and that the reason he did 
not answer the complaint is that he did not read the summons. 
Even for parties who elect to repreeent themselves, some 
effort must be required by the court . Defendant exerted virtually 
no effort to understand what the court required of him. Instead, 
he attempted to bluff his way through the proceedings, having made 
a deliberate decision not to seek advice of counsel because he was 
sure of the rightness of his position. The court also believes he 
intended to save on his own expenses by representing himself while 
at the same time increasing the costs of his r epresented opponent 
by resisting s trenuously her every effor t . Unfortunately, 
defendant's strenuous efforts failed to include actually readi ng 
the summons and complaint. The court does not treat all part ies 
equally if it allows a self represented party to declare a "kings 
X" after his solo efforts have ended in disaster. 
The only ground for setting aside the default which the court 
considers seriously is the truly odd choice of plaintiff's counsel 
to serve defendant with a 10 day summons. Counsel still has not 
explained his decision to issue a summons allowing only ten days 
for the filing of an answer. Rule 3(a) (2), U.R.C.P., does provi de 
for the issuance of ·a ten day summons. However, "ten days" r efers 
to the time after service i n which plaintiff can file the 
complai nt , not the time for de f endant to ans wer. 
Rule 12(a), U.R.C . P., requires that an answer be filed withi n 
either 20 or 30 days after service of the s ummons and compla i nt 
depending on whether the service is accomplished ins ide or outside 
Utah. Because service was a ccompl i shed in Utah, 20 days would be 
required here i n t he absence of a contrary provi sion . The cour t 
invited counsel for plaintiff to explain in his memorandu.m what 
statutory provision justified allowing only ten days. Counsel has 
provided none . The court is accordingly compelled to determine 
that the summons served on defendant incorrectly stated that 
defendant had only ten days to answer the complaint. 
The key question presented here ia whether such a glaring 
defect in the language of the summons justifies a determination 
that service itself was ineffective. The facts are clear. 
Defendant was served on April 30, 2013. The default certificate 
was signed on July 10, 2013. Notwithstanding the language of the 
summons, defendant was not required to answer in ten days. Rather, 
he had a full 80 days in which he could have filed an answer before 
the default was entered. 
The parties have cited no case where a summons erroneously 
allowed ten days instead of 20 days. However, there are several 
cases involving a summons purporting to allow only 20 days when the 
law actually allowed 30 days. In Martin v. Nelson, 533 P.2d 897 
(Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court held that service of a 20 day 
summons when a 30 day summons was required rendered servi ce fatally 
defective, and the default judgment was vacated. It is worth 
noting that, in Martin, the serving officer made a false statement 
in his return of service. In Meyers v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 
879 (Utah 1981), however, the Utah Supreme Court approved amendment 
of the summons from 20 days to 30 days rather than dismissal. In 
Kenny v. Rich, 186 P.3d 989, 2008 UT App. 209, the Utah Court of 
Appeals extended the rationale of Meyers to validate a 20 day 
summons when a 30 days summons should have been served, given that 
the trial court had allowed the full 30 days. 
There is no question that, in this case, defendant was not 
affected or prejudiced by the summons using ten days when 20 days 
were required. The reason defendant did not answer the complaint 
is that he was so confident of his unadvised opinions that he 
failed to even consider that an answer would be required. A 
cursory reading of the summons with a minimum of attention would 
have sufficed, but this defendant declined to do. 
This court interprets Meyers and Kenny to be as applicable to 
a case where a summons erroneously reads "ten" where it should read 
"20" as it is to a case where a summons reads "20" instead of "3on. 
Accordingly, given that the defect did not deceive or confuse or 
prejudice defendant, and that defendant ended up with 80 days in 
which to answer, the court concludes that the defect in the summons 
does not warrant setting aside the default. 
In considering the equities of defendant's motion the court 
has taken into account that defendant has a 99 year lease at $150 
per month for a parcel of truly unique property in Utah's canyon 
country. The court also recalls from previous litigation that 
defendant has made substantial improvements to the property. The 
court accepts that this property may be worth as much as defendant 
claims, namely millions of dollars. 
On the other hand, defendant has had possession of the 
property for almost 20 years and had substantial opportunity to 
garner the fruits of that possession. Earlier litigation about 
this property could not have left defendant in doubt about his 
status as a tenant rather than an owner. As far as this court 
knows, no party has ever raised a question about the sufficiency of 
the consideration paid by defendant for possession of the property, 
but in evaluating the equities of this case, the court cannot help 
but notice that a rental of $150 per month would capitalize to a 
value of about $15-30 thousand. In other words, most tenants would 
expect to pay $150 ·per month on an annual lease for a property 
worth $15 to 30 thousand. Yet, defendant managed to secure a 99 
year lease for a fixed rent of $150 per month on unique property 
with value supposedly in the millions of dollars. The best that 
could be said about· this situation is that defendant, with such 
favorable lease terms, should have been exceedingly careful not to 
breach any provision of the lease. 
Finally, the court notes from the earl i er proceeding i nvolving 
this property that defendant is a benefic iary of the trust o f which 
plaintiff is trustee. Therefore, termination of the lease does not 
deprive defendant of every benefit of the property. It does mean 
that he will have to share those benefits with the other 
beneficiaries of the trust. 
Defendant's motion is denied. Counsel for plaintiff should 
submit a formal order pursuant to Rule 7, U.R.C.P. 
DATED this /~/ti day of August, 2014. 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 130700012 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
EMAIL: CRAIG C HALLS 
EMAIL: JOANE P WHITE 
08/13/2014 
Date: 
Printed: 08/13/14 15:40 : 56 
/s/ CONNIE ADAMS 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE JUDGMENT 
i Case Number 130700012 
i 
I Judge: Lyle R. Anderson 
I 
The matter came on for hearing on Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Order of Judgment 
and Writ of Restitution on the 7th day of February, 2014 and was reheard on the 24u, day of 
February, 2014. The Court now being fu lly advised in the premises does hereby make the 
following Findings of Fact: 
1. The Court does not credit the testimony of Rodney Tangren that he was not actuall:-, 
served with a Summons and Complaint and that he was confused by multiple proceedings befo::e 
this Court and did not understand the need to answer the Complaint. 
2. The Court finds that with the evidence presented , that Defendant was properly c:erved 
w ith a Summons and Complaint and that the reason he did not answer the Complaint was thm h~ 
did not read the Summons. 
TangrenFarnTrust.Ord Deny Mot set aside Judgment.wpd 
September 15, 2014 08:33 PM 1 of :3 
3. The Court finds that M r. Tangren exe1ted v i1tually no effo1t to understand what was 
required of him w ith regard to the Summons. 
4. The Court finds that instead of acting upon the Summons he attempted to bluff his 
way through the proceedings. 
5. The Cou1t finds that Mr. Tang ren made a deliberate decision not to seek advice of 
counsel because he was sure of the rightness of his position. 
6. The Court finds that Mr. Tangren intended to save on his own expenses by 
representing himself at the same time intending to increase the costs of his opponent by resisting 
strenuously her every effort. 
7. The Court finds that the only grounds for setting aside the default in this case that the 
Court considered seriously is the odd choice of Plaintiffs counsel to serve Defendant with a ten 
(10) day Summons. 
8. The Court finds that the Plaintiff was invited to indicate to the Court any statutory 
authority for filing a ten ( I 0) day Summons. Plaintiff has provided none. 
9. The Court finds that the Summons incorrectly stated that the Defendant had only ten 
(10) days to answer the Complaint. 
I 0. The Court finds that Lhe issue then before the Court is the determination of whether 
that service is in itself ineffective. 
11 . The Court finds that the Defendant was served on Apri l 30, 201 3, and the Defaul: 
Certificate w as s igned on July IO, 20 13. 
12. The Court finds that notw ithstanding the language the Defendant was not required to 
answer in that ten ( I 0) day pe riod, but ra ther he had a full eighty (80) days in which he co·Jld 
have fi led an answer be fore the defau lt was entered. 
2 
TangrenFamTrust.Ord Deny Mot set aside .ludgment. wpd 
September 15, 2014 08:33 PM 
13. The Court finds that there is case authority in Utah to allow a party to approve a 
summons where a shorter period of time was stated in the summons, but a greater period was 
allowed. 
14. The Court finds that the Defendant in this case was not effected or prejudiced by the 
Summons using ten ( I 0) days when hventy (20) days were required. 
15. The Court finds that the defect in the Summons where it read ten (10) days when it 
should have read twenty (20) days did not deceive, confuse or prejudice the Defendant and that 
the Defendant had up to eighty (80) days in which to answer. 
THEREFORE The Court concludes that the defect in the Summons does not warrant 
setting aside the default. The Motion to Set Aside the Default and the Writ of Restitution is 
hereby denied. The Judgment entered on the 2nd day of December, 2013 in the amount of Six 
Thousand Sixty Three Dollars and Fifty One Cents ($6,063.51) is in full force. A Writ of 
Restitution is valid and effectual for the possession of the property by the Plaintiffs. 
End of Document 
---- - ---- - - ------------
,., 
.) 
TangrenFamTrust.Ord Deny Mot set aside Judgment.wpd 
September 15, 2014 08:33 PM 3 of 3 
A.ddc:nd urn "1// Niartin Vo l\Te!son (U-np1.1blis:hed 
Case) 
56 of 5() 
Page 1 
Lexis Nexis® 
Leona M. Nelson MARTIN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. George L. NELSON, Jr., 
Defendant and Appellant 
No. 13805 
Supreme Court of Utah 
533 P.2d 897; 1975 Utah LEXIS 669 
April 4, 1975 
COUNSEL: [*l] Leon A. Halgren, Ryberg, McCoy & 
Halgren, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appe llant. 
Gayle Dean Hunt, Mikel M. Boley, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
JUDGES: HENRIOD, Chief Justice, wrote the opinion. 
ELLETT, CROCKETT, TUCKETT and MAUGHAN, 
JJ., concur. 
O!PINION BY: HENRIOD 
OPINION 
HENRJOD. Chief Justice: 
Appeal from a judgment entered on a complaint 
based on accrued amounts a llegedly due m a divorce 
action. Reversed with costs to defendant. 
Mr. N, a California resident, was served with process 
by a California peace officer, who, under oath in a return 
of service of summons, wittingly or unwittingly falsified 
the facts by stating therein that he endorsed the date and 
place of address, together with signing his name on the 
Summons, as is required by Rule 4(j), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The paper involved shows, without 
controversy, that such statement was untru,,. 
Service of process here was defective, not on ly 
because of the false return but because it required answer 
in 20 days instead of 30 days. 1 Such service is 
jurisdictional. 2 Defendant, as was his right, appeared 
specially and raised the point. 
Title 78-27-25 et seq., Utah Code Annotated 
1953. 
2 Rule 4(j), Utah Rules of Civil Pracedure. 
[*2] The case is remanded with ins1ruction to 
vacate the judgment and let the parties rake it from there. 
ELLETT, CROCKETT, TUCKETT and 
MAUGHAN, JJ., concur. 
